



Multilateral Kant Colloquium

8th Edition

with the support of SISK - Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani

Kant



and the

Contemporary World

Philosophy, Science, Politics



October 11-13, 2018

Department of Political and Social Sciences

University of Catania

via Gravina, 12

The 8th Edition of the Multilateral Kant Colloquium is held at the University of Catania on October 11-13, 2018. Scholars from all over the world are involved in presentations and discussions of the most up-to-date research on Kant's philosophy. With the support of the SISK, MCAA and MARIE CURIE RISE, the conference is part of an annual initiative started in 2008 by an international group of scholars keen on promoting informed debate on the latest developments of Kant scholarships. Previous editions took place in Italy ("Kant Today", Verona and Padua), Portugal ("What is Man? – Was ist der Mensch?", Lisbon 2009), Germany ("Kant and Antinomical Thinking", Mainz 2011; and "Kant and His Critics", Halle 2017), Brazil ("Kant and the Metaphors of Reason", Tiradentes 2013), Spain ("Kant's Short Writings – Kleine Schriften", Madrid 2014), and the United States ("Kant on Violence, Revolution, and Progress", Hempstead, NY 2016). The current edition aims at highlighting the relevance of Kantian thought with respect to the contemporary world, which becomes increasingly acknowledged in a wide number of issues crosscutting both the theoretical and practical sides of his work.

Director

Luigi Caranti – Professor of Political Philosophy, Università di Catania
lcaranti@unict.it

Organizers

Nunzio Alì – Post-Doctoral Researcher, Universidade de São Paulo
nunzioali@gmail.com

Denise Celentano – PhD Student, Università di Catania & École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales / Post-Doctoral Fellow, New York University
denise.celentano@ehess.fr

www.multilateralkantcolloquium8thedition.weebly.com

Abstract and brief biography of participants

Keynotes

ROBERT LOUDEN Distinguished Professor and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern Maine. His publications include Kant's Human Being (Oxford University Press 2011), The World We Want (OUP 2007), Kant's Impure Ethics (OUP 2000), and Morality and Moral Theory (OUP 1992). A past president of the North American Kant Society (2009-2014), Louden is also editor and translator of two volumes in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.

Abstract: Kant the Naturalist

In this paper I argue that Kant is not just the father of transcendental philosophy but also a naturalist of sorts. He wears at least two hats in his work -- a transcendental hat and a naturalist hat. I try to show that Kant the naturalist not only exists, but that he is also a philosophical force to be reckoned with. Kant the naturalist has often been overlooked by professional philosophers, who -- as Richard Rorty observed -- are intent on "keeping philosophy pure." But the field of Kantian studies becomes much richer and more substantive when the other Kant is brought into the picture. Two Kants are better than one.

BERND DÖRFLINGER Graduation in Mainz 1986 with a thesis on Kant's "Critique of Judgment", habilitation in 1995 with the writing "Das Leben theoretischer Vernunft". Since 1999 co-editor of the Kant-Studien and the Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte. Since 2000 professor of philosophy at the university of Trier and head of the Kant research center. Since 2004 first chairman of the Kant-Gesellschaft.

Abstract: Critique and Progress of The Kantian Theory of Space

The "Transcendental Aesthetic" within the "Critique of Pure Reason" seems to contain Kant's official position on space. According to this, space is a subjective form of intuition. It is conceived of as infinite in two ways, as infinitely extended, and as infinitely divisible. The source of knowledge that corresponds to the spacial idea is the receptive one, i.e. sensibility. It is, therefore, puzzling that, in contrast to this, Kant later states that the idea of spacial extension, for instance that of a certain line, depends on a synthesis, and therefore relies on the spontaneous source of knowledge. Gerold Prauss has elaborately developed the problems that are associated with these contrasting characterizations. In addition, he has proposed innovative solutions that can be considered consequent radicalizations of Kant's transcendental-philosophical approach. These include the considerations that the original idea of spacial extension results from spontaneous subjective productivity, and that space is originally represented as a continuum, but not as a quantum continuum, that is, not as immediately divided into discrete parts, but as a unit with its own qualitative nature.

PAUL GUYER Jonathan Nelson Professor of Humanities and Philosophy at Brown University. He is the author, editor, and/or translator of twenty-five books, including ten books on Kant, three

volumes of translation in the Cambridge Edition, and a three-volume History of Modern Aesthetics, appearing in paperback in 2018. He is currently completing a book on Kant and Mendelssohn.

Abstract: Principles of Justice, Primary Goods, and the Categories of Right: Rawls and Kant

John Rawls based his theory of justice, in the work of that name, on a “Kantian interpretation” of the status of human beings as “free and equal” persons. In his subsequent, “political rather than metaphysical,” expositions of his theory, the conception of citizens of democracies as “free and equal” persons retained its foundational role. But Rawls appealed only to Kant’s moral philosophy, never to Kant’s own political philosophy as expounded in his 1797 “Doctrine of Right” in the Metaphysics of Morals. I argue here that the structure of Kant’s political philosophy, with its categories of the innate right to freedom, private acquired right, and public right, can clarify the relationship between Rawls’s two principles of justice and his scheme of basic liberties and primary goods.

PAULINE KLEINGELD Professor of Ethics and Chair of the Department of Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy at the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. Her research is in the fields of ethics and political philosophy, with a special interest in Immanuel Kant and Kantianism.

Abstract: Kant’s Conception of Freedom of the Will

Kant defends the belief in freedom of the will. He also argues that the natural world is thoroughly deterministic, and that we can in principle “calculate” a person’s future conduct with certainty (though in practice our knowledge is too limited to do so). However, he forcefully rejects the dominant philosophical strategy for reconciling freedom of the will with natural determinism. In the literature, Kant’s position is therefore widely regarded as puzzling and problematic. In this paper I argue that his conception of free will has been misunderstood. Kant uses the definition of freedom found in the republican tradition of political theory, according to which ‘freedom’ is opposed to ‘domination’ – not to ‘determinism’ or ‘constraint’. Thus understood, Kant’s defense of freedom of the will turns out to be much less puzzling and to make a lot more philosophical sense.

MARIO CAIMI Prof. Dr. (retired). Study of Philosophy at the Univ. of Buenos Aires. Dr. phil. from the Univ. of Mainz. Author of many essays on Kant’s theoretical Philosophy. Translator in Spanish of many Kant’s works, among them the Critique of Pure Reason. His work has won the award (Kant prize) of the International Kant Gesellschaft.

Abstract: The Transcendental Deduction of the Ideas in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic

The paper begins with an exposition of several versions of a transcendental Deduction of the ideas of reason supplied in the Appendix of the Dialectic in the Critique of Pure Reason. The exposition includes the examination of some concepts which are involved in these versions of the Deduction, like those of object in the idea, of relative assumption, of analogy and of symbol. Finally, an early

version of another deduction of the ideas to be found in the Canon of Pure Reason is presented. The author suggests that this latter deduction (carried out later on in the Postulates of Practical Reason and in the *Fortschritte der Metaphysik*) amounts to the foundation of a new kind of metaphysics. Kant calls it “practical-dogmatical metaphysic” and distinguishes it both from a theoretical and from a purely practical metaphysics.

PATRICIA KAUARK LEITE Associate Professor of Philosophy at Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG-Brazil) and CNPq (Brazil) Researcher. She received her PhD from Ecole Polytechnique (Paris) in 2004. She was visiting scholar at Stanford University in 2011-2012 and IEAT/UFMG resident professor in 2015-2016. Her book *Théorie quantique et philosophie transcendantale: dialogues possibles* (Paris: Hermann, 2012) won the Prize Louis Liard (2012) from Académie des sciences morales et politiques (France). She works on Kant and philosophy of science.

Abstract: Kant, Normativity and Reflective Causal Inference

The aim of this work is to discuss the role of reflective judgments in Kant’s theory of epistemic normativity. Many authors, like Pollok and others, seem to restrict epistemic normativity merely to the domain of the conceptual rules of the faculty of understanding. In contrast to them, I would like to argue that the normative function of reflective inferences of the teleological power of judgment is also necessary in order to constitute our knowledge of the physical world as an organic and unified system.

LUCA FONNESU Full professor of Moral philosophy in the University of Pavia. His research concerns German Classical Philosophy between Kant and Hegel, the history and analysis of moral concepts and contemporary ethics.

Abstract: Kant on Communication

Although relatively neglected, the conceptual constellation of “communication” does play a central role in Kant’s thought. This is so true, that the very concept of “communication”, *Mitteilung*, receives only with Kant a theoretical importance in Western philosophical tradition. Beside its simplest meaning concerning politics and human relationships, communication and communicability run through Kantian philosophy with an original and deep grounding function, which supports Kant’s conception of human reason.

I – Thursday, 11 October (Morning)

ROOM A1

PREDRAG ŠUSTAR Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka, Croatia. Apart from degrees in Philosophy, he also holds MSc in Molecular Biology. His AOS is based in the philosophy of science, in particular, in the philosophy of biology. In addition, he has

strong and long-standing research interest in Kant's philosophy of the biological sciences and the third Critique's epistemological project, more generally.

ZDENKA BRZOVIĆ PhD student and junior researcher at the Department of Philosophy, University of Rijeka, Croatia. Her AOS is philosophy of science, with emphasis on the philosophy of biology and the biomedical sciences. Her PhD research is focused on the topics of natural kinds and classification. In the context of that research, she is also interested in examining Kant's account of kinds and classification in the biological sciences

Abstract: Empirical Laws of Nature, Unity of Experience as a System and Teleological Judgments in Biology

There are two main issues related to the general account of empirical laws of nature: the necessity and the knowability issues. In addition, the role of the presupposition of the unity of experience as a system (UES) should be determined with respect to Kant's account in question. In this paper, we primarily focus on the knowability of empirical laws. We further explore the interpretative thread according to which the knowability is secured through classification within a hierarchical ordering of more general concepts and/or judgments. In our view, the relationship between the knowability and classification of this kind is ultimately based on Kant's characterization of our understanding as being "discursive", that is, specifically relying on subsumptive procedures. In addition, the third Critique addresses the class of teleological judgments that should also have the status of empirical laws. The specificity of empirical laws of nature referring to biological phenomena is a consequence of the mechanism-teleology general relation in Kant's philosophy of biology. In that regard, we argue that (i) the knowability of biological laws equally relies on subsumptive procedures, which are, in this specific case, consisting in an explanatory integration between teleological and causal-mechanical judgments; (ii) the role played by UES is, in that way, departing from a merely hierarchical one.

INÊS SALGUEIRO Graduated in philosophy from the Nova University of Lisbon, where she is currently a junior research fellow at the Ethics and Political Philosophy Lab at the Nova Institute of Philosophy. She has publications in Germany and Spain. Her research interests concentrate on the normative dimension of Kant's ethical thought.

Abstract: Kant on Causality and Free Will: A Case-Study

This paper examines the impact of the problem of causality on Kant's moral philosophy, more specifically the influence of Hume on Kant's view of free will. I claim that the concept of "transcendental" is in Kant the key not only to answering the theoretical problem of causality but also to tackle the practical problem of freedom. My specific goal in this paper is to analyze some results from a case-study that help us see how the transcendental works at a practical level. I shall focus on the application of the concept to the mother-child relationship. I shall attempt to show that from the moment of conception until the second year of life there is already a transcendental activity, a synthetic unity that can be found when the baby begins to perceive herself or himself as

the cause of her or his actions. Thus, I explore the application of the transcendental to the universe of the baby, namely in her or his cognitive, affective, emotional and moral development.

LEONID KORNILAEV Research fellow at the Academia Kantiana of the Institute for Humanities at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (Kalininograd, Russia). He received his Phd in Philosophy from the Lomonosov Moscow State University in 2017. His areas of specialization are the history of philosophy (in particular Kant and Neo-Kantianism) and the epistemology.

Abstract: Kant's "Construction of Concepts" and the Process of Formation of New Sciences

Interdisciplinary research as an integrative process of modern knowledge plays an important role in the development of knowledge. My presentation aims to correlate Kant's ideas about scientific-theoretical knowledge with the process of formation of new sciences. The problem of the formation of new sciences is inextricably linked with the problem of constructing concepts. Kant's theory of "the construction of concepts" has contemporary relevance, and manifestations of its actions can be observed in modern interdisciplinary research. Contemporary interdisciplinary research, if we look at it from the standpoint of science during modernity is just a tool for interrogating nature, it is a method that allows to create conditions for a unique, new way of constructing concepts, resulting in the formation of new sciences.

JONAS HELD Assistant professor "wissenschaftlicher Assistent" at the University of Leipzig, Germany (since autumn 2016). He completed his PhD thesis on the concept of "inferring" 2016 at the University of Basel, Switzerland.

Abstract: Kant's Answer to the Frege-Geach Problem

Since the influential work of Gottlob Frege, it is common to take a judgment to be built up by two parts, a propositional content and a mental act of taking or representing the propositional content to be true. According to this view, the logical form of the propositional content is independent of the mental act of taking or representing it to be true. Following Frege, this distinction can be called the force-content distinction. There is no such distinction in Kant. For Kant, a judgment is a combination of concepts or other judgments. The unity of the propositional content is therefore not independent of the activity of combining concepts or judgments to this unity. Frege has a strong argument against such a view. Peter Geach has called this argument the Frege-Point. In my talk, I will show that Kant is well aware of this problem and that he has an answer to it.

ROOM A2

LORENZO SALA PhD student at the University of Pisa, where he is writing a dissertation on Kant's theory of consciousness and its role in the Critique of Pure Reason. He has studied in Universität zu Köln, University of Warwick and Johns Hopkins University and works also on Hegel's philosophy and pre-kantian metaphysics. He recently published an article on the role of the question of synthetic a priori judgements in the genesis of the Critique of Judgement, and another article on Hegel's notion of objective thought is going to be published soon.

Abstract: The Under-Appreciated Role of Inner Sense: Kant on “I think” and Self-Knowledge

In my talk I want to explore the role of the often neglected notion of inner sense in Kant's theory of self-consciousness and self-knowledge. This role, I contend, is often under-appreciated. In order to explain the role of inner sense and highlight its importance, I will provide an analysis Kant's famous sentence “the I think must be able to accompany all my representations”. Where, in general, interpreters tend to focus on only on the role that pure apperception plays in making I think accompaniment possible, I will try to show how inner sense plays an equally necessary role in making I think accompaniment possible, a role that is complementary to that of apperception but is generally ignored.

UBIRAJARA RANCAN DE AZEVEDO MARQUES Associate Professor at the Philosophy Department of the São Paulo State University. His Ph.D. concerns the French School of historiography of philosophy. For the past 12 years he has devoted his researches to some themes and certain problems of Kant's thought related to the innate and the a priori, and to the musical and embryological metaphors.

Abstract: Embryologic Comparisons in the Architektonikkapitel

In 1781, prior to any Kantian reference in favor of the epigenesis—a direct, nominal reference, published in life—, two comparative passages of the “Architectonic of Pure Reason” will have drawn no attention from his readers. But, despite omitting that “augmentation” [Vermehrung], such passages shall lead, both on its own and jointly, to the possibility of a retrospective conflict regarding that theory; a conflict of a conceptual nature which may have repercussions on Kant's position on the epigenesis, be it directly, on a metaphorical-speculative level, be it indirectly, on an embryological level. The present, ongoing study shall deal with the collocation of the problem, the presentation of some elements in view of its analysis and, finally, a possible solution for the difficulties which the two passages of both editions of the Critique indirectly raise.

GABRIELE GAVA Research associate at Goethe University Frankfurt, where he runs a project on “The pre-history of Kant's nonevidentialism.” Previously, he has been a postdoctoral fellow of the Humboldt Foundation at the same institution. He received his PhD in 2009 from the University of Pisa.

Abstract: Kant, the Third Antinomy and Transcendental Arguments

In this paper I considered whether a reading of Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy can offer material for devising a new model for transcendental argument. The problem that this form of argument is meant to address is an antinomy between two apparently contradictory claims, q and $\neg q$, where we seem equally justified to hold both. The model has the following form: p ; q is a necessary condition of p ; the only justification we have for q is that it is a necessary condition of p ; p is justified only in the domain X (where X is a domain of objects of cognition); Therefore, q is justified only in the domain X . Since the argument shows that our justification for q is valid only in X , it also establishes that there is conceptual space to hold $\neg q$ outside of X .

LORENZO SPAGNESI After an undergraduate degree in Economics, he received a master's degree in Philosophy at Università Cattolica (Milan). He is currently a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh (funded by the ERC). His research focuses on Kant, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. In particular, his doctoral work aims at examining the Kantian roots of 'perspectival realism'

Abstract: Reason as the “Touchstone of Truth”

Is epistemic relativism a dead-end for truth? I suggest that Kant elaborated a form of perspectivism, which, far from being a dismissal of realism, was instead committed to solving the problem of truth in the new transcendental context. I argue that there is a metaphysical gap between the formal possibility assured by the laws of the understanding (particularly, the Second Analogy), and the reality of empirical laws. Without the middle ground of real possibility, the understanding would merely end up with singular connections, and our cognition would be disoriented and incomplete. My proposal is that this gap can only be bridged through the cooperation of reason and understanding. Reason does not simply require an additional systematisation of already acquired laws but precedes the understanding in its conceptualisation and generates through its principles a perspectival space, in which ideas can act as real grounds and confer intersubjective truth upon our perspectives.

ROOM A3

LU CHAO PhD student of KU Leuven who has been studying Kant's philosophy of religion. Her doctoral dissertation is named Kant's Theory of Radical Evil and the Limit of Free Will and will be defended in May 2018. Chapters of this dissertation have been accepted for presentation in Leuven Kant Conference (2015, 2017, and 2018).

Abstract: Radical Evil and Kant's Pessimistic Estimation of Human Nature

The core claim of Kant's theory of radical evil, i.e. 'the human being is by nature evil' means that everyone has a subjectively universal and necessary propensity to evil. The key to justifying this bold claim consists in interpreting the propensity to evil as a potentiality to evil that belongs to the human species and becomes actualized in individuals through their free choice. We can trace the generality of actually evil actions regressively back to the universality (and also necessity) of the propensity to evil. Given this propensity, Kant's estimation of human nature is pessimistic. On the one hand, this estimation can do full justice to the tragical reality of the 20th century, while on the other hand, it demands any endeavor to establish good societies and cultivate good citizens be placed on a realistic road that is equipped with a deep awareness of our inner enemy.

OLGA LENCZEWSKA Doctoral candidate in philosophy at Stanford University and a research fellow at the Stanford Basic Income Lab. Prior to starting her PhD, she studied at the University of Oxford. Her primary research interests are Kant and contemporary political philosophy.

Abstract: From Rationality to Morality: the Collective Development of Practical Reason in Kant's Anthropological Writings

Kant's anthropological essays "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim" and the often neglected "Conjectural Beginning of Human History" offer an account of the transition between the initial and mature uses of practical reason, and thus an account of our species' evolution into beings who can set ends in accordance with the moral law. My paper shows that in the light of these texts our attainment of the status of moral agents governed by the moral law is the final stage of a process of the collective development of our species' social and rational capacities. Moreover, it shows that these writings suggest that although humans entered the condition of sociality for egoistic reasons, the reasons for socio-political co-existence changed from self-interested to moral alongside the gradual development of practical reason.

CHENG HAO LIN PhD student at Ludwig-Maximilians University in Munich, working on the dissertation topic about Kant's theory of the self. He is also interested in Kant's concept of highest good, german idealism and the relation between Kant's transcendental philosophy and contemporary analytic philosophy.

Abstract: The Ambiguity of the Concept of the Highest Good and the Most Reasonable Understanding

The aim of this paper is to solve the tension between Kant's doctrine of the highest good and his entire philosophical system. The concept of the highest good is the first major ambiguity of the doctrine. There are three pairs of ambiguities: immanent-transcendent, justice-perfection and individual-community. They are able to form eight combinations. Corresponding to the various combinations and conceptions of the highest good, interpreters also conceive different reasons of the necessity of the doctrine as well as various conditions of its applicability. In this paper, I try an unpopular approach of understanding the highest good's systematic meaning as the moral confirmation and suggest that only a transcendent, perfect and communal concept of the highest good can provide the most consistent doctrine.

COURTNEY MORRIS Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Along with a developing interest in Kant's philosophy of education, she is interested in Kant's theoretical philosophy, Early Modern Philosophy, and 19th-Century Philosophy.

Abstract: Kant on Being Well-Educated

In this paper I examine an aspect of Kant's theory of education. Specifically, I analyze Kant's suggested method for the "moralization" of a student: that of the "moral catechism." At first glance, it seems as though the method, which requires the students to memorize questions and answers his instructor gives to him, conflicts with one goal of a well-educated person: intellectual and moral autonomy. How does route memorization, via a rather dogmatic method, supposedly cultivate independent thought and action? I argue that the method, which I call "Kant's Eoretic Method" (to be contrasted to the Socratic Method), is aimed at honing one's eoretic skills; a good education, for Kant, is one that gives a student the proper background understanding and context

to know which questions to ask, what types of responses are candidates for good answers, and why. I also argue that this method has an analog in the theoretical realm, and hence cultivates intellectual as well as moral autonomy.

ROOM A4

RÔMULO EISINGER GUIMARÃES Bachelor in Visual Arts (2012) at Federal University of Santa Maria, UFSM, Brazil (Adv: Alphonsus Benetti); Master in Philosophy (2015), at UFSM (Adv: Christian Hamm); PhD in Philosophy (2016-), at UFSM (Adv: Christian Hamm); Sandwich PhD (2018-2019) at Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany (Adv: Andrea Esser).

Abstract: On Normativity and Requirement of Unanimous Agreement in Pure Aesthetic Judgments

There are no few passages, in the Critique of Judgment, in which Kant presents elements that are, at first sight, strange. Purposiveness without representation of an end [KU, AA05: 236], subjectively universal validity [KU, AA05: 215] and satisfaction without any interest [KU, AA05: 211] are some argumentative figures that illustrate the not rare obscurity of the Kantian text. This paper focuses on some obscurities of the argumentation developed in the third Critique – more specifically, with regard to the normativity of pure aesthetic judgments and to the difficulty of determining the location and systematic function of the figures of a universal voice and a sensus communis in judgments-of-taste, in an attempt to verify what is really required of us (and what we require), in a unanimous agreement, in judgments such as "this is beautiful!"

IRENE BREUER Graduated in Architecture (1988) and in Philosophy (2003) at the UBA, Argentina. PhD in Philosophy from the Bergische University Wuppertal (BUW) in 2012. From 2012 to mid 2017 lecturer in „Theoretical Philosophy and Phenomenology“ at the BUW. Presently: working on a research project on the Argentinian reception of the German philosophical anthropology.

Abstract: Revisiting Kant's Sublime – Towards a Phenomenological Sublime

My paper aims at reconsidering Kant's theory of the sublime, a feeling no longer aroused by an overwhelming feeling of self-transcendence, but by the arousal of the bodily sensuousness. Present architecture calls forth a tension between our traditional bodily habits and our bodily lived experiences. Hence, the disruption of the bodily metaphor leads paradoxically enough to a sublime bodily experience of space, and thus, to a phenomenological feeling of the sublime. The phenomenological sublime is a feeling aroused neither by the power of our reason transcending the inadequacy of imagination as it concerns nature, nor by the overwhelming powers of imagination as it concern an artwork, but by the excess of sensuousness engendering an uncanny experience. I will attempt to show that this shift took place in the XX. century resulting from Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's reformulation of Kant's conception of the sublime.

SERENA FELOJ Teaches aesthetics at the University of Pavia. Her main interest are in Kantian philosophy, German classical aesthetics and analytic aesthetics. She has been visiting scholar at

the Universities of Heidelberg, Marburg, Cologne, Frankfurt am Main, Halle. She is author of the books: The sublime in Kant's thought (Il sublime nel pensiero di Kant, Morcelliana 2012); Aesthetics of disgust. Mendelssohn, Kant and the limits of representation (Estetica del disgusto. Mendelssohn, Kant e i limiti della rappresentazione, Carocci 2017).

Abstract: Aesthetic Normativity: Which Role for Kant's Judgment of Taste in the Contemporary Debate?

In the light of the current debate on aesthetic normativity, the role played by the aesthetic judgment within Kant's account has possibly all it takes to be a real game changer. The notion of normativity has been indeed key to an actualizing reading of the subjective universality that for Kant characterizes the aesthetic judgment. However, in the scholarly literature little discussion is made, somehow unsurprisingly, of what exactly we should understand by normativity when it comes to Kant's aesthetic. I will argue that the sentimental elements of Kant's account call for a revision of its normative interpretations, for a better framing of its subjective universalism, and finally for a reconsideration of aesthetic normativity in favour of regulativity and exemplarity.

PAULA ÓRDENES: holds a degree in Philosophy from the University of Chile and is currently a DAAD scholar and PhD student at the University of Heidelberg, Germany. Until now, she has only been concerned with the study of Kant's critical philosophy. She has organized congresses in both Chile and Germany on Kantian thought and has participated as a contributor and co-editor in collections dedicated to Kant philosophy.

Abstract: The Systematic Origin of the Division of the Sublime: Mathematical and Dynamic

In the Critique of Power of Judgement Kant distinguishes between two types of aesthetic judgement of the sublime. First, the mathematical and second, the dynamic judgment of the sublime. In paragraph 24 Kant states that such a division is derived from the relationship between the power of judgement and the moods (Stimmungen) of imagination. In the mathematical sublime, aesthetic judgment refers to the powers of cognition through the mathematical mood of the imagination. In the dynamic sublime, aesthetic judgement refers to the power of desire through the dynamic mood of imagination. However, Kant's critical system neither discusses nor mentions that imagination contains a mathematical and a dynamic mood. Therefore, it is not possible to comprehend from this explanation an obvious necessity of the division mentioned. Nevertheless, under the preliminary assumption that Kantian philosophy is systematic, there should be a reason to fill this explanation gap. The present lecture deals with the search for a systematic answer to the reason for such a division.

ROOM A5

NURIA SANCHEZ MADRID is Associate Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University Complutense of Madrid and external member of the Centre of Philosophy of the Univ. of Lisbon and of the Institute of Philosophy of the Univ. of Oporto. She has been visiting professor in Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, Greece, France, Germany, Italy and Portugal. She organized collected volumes

and contributed to books published by Walter de Gruyter, Palgrave McMillan, Univ. of Wales Press and Olms. She is secretary of redaction of the Scopus journals "Isegoría" and "Con-textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy".

Abstract: Kant on Poverty and Political Agency: Rethinking the Republican Struggle for Civil Recognition

Kant still inspires several of the contemporary approaches to the construction of citizenship. Taking into account this fact, I would like to tackle some features of the historical gap that separates Kant's notion of citizenship from the one adopted by most current deliberative democracies. I shall meanly focus on issues as poverty relief, the right to vote and the forms of civil recognition for appraising how much Kant's political philosophy is far from the notion of human political development generally accepted in our present.

VADIM CHALY is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (Kaliningrad, Russia).

Abstract: Kant's Notion of Humanity and Its Political Implications

Humanity (*Menschheit*) is among pivotal notions of Kant's philosophy. It stemmed from the XVIII-century debates of *Aufklärung*, received distinct treatment in Kant's critical works, and now is central to many discussions of politics and morals, dividing parties of universalists and particularists, statists and libertarians, progressists and conservatives, etc. The task is to present an analysis of restatements of Kant's notion of humanity in contemporary philosophy (by Korsgaard, Meld Shell, Rawls, Wood, among others) and to examine how well these hold against some criticisms of liberal as well as non-liberal sort.

ALESSANDRO PINZANI Professor of Ethics and Political Philosophy at the Federal University of Santa Catarina. He holds a Masters Degree in Philosophy from the University of Florence, Italy (1992), PhD in Philosophy from the University of Tübingen, Germany (1997), and a postdoctoral degree from Columbia University in New York (2001-2002 with an Alexander-von-Humboldt-Stiftung scholarship). He obtained Habilitation and Venia Legendi in philosophy at Universität Tübingen (2004). His books include: "An den Wurzeln moderner Demokratie" (Berlin, 2009), "Jürgen Habermas" (Munich, 2007) and "Vozes do Bolsa Família. Autonomy, money and citizenship" (co-authored with Walquíria Leão Rego, São Paulo, 2013).

NUNZIO ALÌ is currently a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Universidade de São Paulo (department of political science). He holds a graduation in Scienze Storiche e Politiche from Università degli Studi di Catania (2010), master-degree in Global Politics And Euro-Mediterranean Relations from Università degli Studi di Catania (2012) and doctorate in Philosophy from Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (2018). Has experience in Philosophy, acting on the following subjects: social justice, democracy, political theory, economic inequality, human rights.

Abstract: How Much Inequality is Acceptable from a Kantian Point of View?

In the Doctrine of Right Kant claims that the present distribution of land may not be questioned, no matter how arbitrary its concrete origins were. In this paper we shall first present Kant's argument, but we shall not discuss it in a critical way. Rather, we shall accept it in its *prima facie* validity and apply it to the global dimension of the possession of natural resources. In doing so, we aim to take the analogy between individuals and states that Kant establishes in his philosophy of international law to its last consequences. Our strategy is very plain: if we consider the application of what we call the *Beati possidentes* principle to be unacceptable on a global level, then we might have good reason to reject it also on the domestic level. In a sense, instead of recurring to an argument from domestic analogy, as many have done with regard to other thinkers, e.g. to Rawls (cf. Pogge 1989), we are inverting it into an argument from global analogy.

PAOLO JESUS studied philosophy and psychology at Coimbra University and Université Catholique de Louvain. In 2006, I obtained my PhD in Philosophy and Social Sciences at EHESS-Paris with a dissertation on time, selfhood and cognition based on Kant's critical works.

Abstract: Kant and Marx on the Nature of Evolution and the Ethics of Revolution

Evolution and revolution are very dense, saturated, concepts that may prove instrumental to articulate continuity and discontinuity, production and destruction, unified and fragmented change, as well as the interaction of mechanical and teleological forces, both in natural and historical phenomena. The main purpose of the present paper consists in examining the ways in which Kant and Marx define, oppose, and relate evolution and revolution, especially by analyzing and questioning their evolutionary vision of moral and political history.

ROOM A6

GUILLAUME ST-LAURENT (Ph. D., Philosophy) is currently Visiting Scholar at Brown University under the supervision of Charles Larmore and Chair in Cultural and Religious Diversity Management at the Institute of Religious Studies of the Université de Montréal (Canada). His research focuses on the philosophy of religion, contemporary hermeneutics, and political liberalism.

Abstract: Public Reason and Transcendental Arguments: The Missing Link in Political Liberalism

The central feature of “political liberalism” is undoubtedly its understanding of *public reason*: the distinction between the considerations relevant for defining the publicly shareable basis of a liberal political order, on the one hand, and the vast domain of our “reasonable disagreements” about the good life and what we are, on the other. But how exactly are we to draw the line between our purely political self-understanding and our more contentious “ethico-metaphysical” views? Relying on the account of transcendental arguments developed by Charles Taylor, I would like to argue that such arguments are centrally relevant to the work of public reason. They enable us to get a better grasp of what the liberal principle of equal respect really entails, that is, of the universal human capacities and interests we need to identify in order to ensure adequate rights

and immunities for everyone. The crucial relationship between public reason and transcendental arguments is indeed the missing link in political liberalism.

ANTÓNIO MARQUES Full Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy of the Universidade Nova de Lisboa/ Portugal. Director of the Institute for Philosophy at the same University. Since his PhD thesis on Kant's third Critique (1987) he has published several articles and books on Kant. His most recent article is "Some notes on Rawls' critique of Kant's comprehensive moral philosophy", *Essay on Values and Practical Rationality – Ethical and Aesthetical Dimensions*, Bern, Berlin: Peter Lang, 2018, pp. 121-133.

Abstract: The Construction of Right From the “Only One Innate Right” in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals

In his *Metaphysics of Morals* (Introduction, DR), Kant introduces the concept of the “one only innate right”, that is freedom insofar as it coexists with the freedom of every other person in accordance with a universal law. This is the well-known definition of right that he gives throughout all the work and there he uses the same concept of freedom, which was already given as an *a priori* principle in his essay *On the common saying...* (1793). This is freedom of human beings in a civil society and it is referred to as “freedom as a human being”. From that notion proceeds entirely the concept of external right, which determines also limitation of action and reciprocal external (juridical) obligations. Such conception of freedom implies a representation of reciprocity and equality of action and reaction, within a commonwealth. Furthermore I argue that in the *MM* the constitution of the principles of right derive from the “only one innate right” by a hybrid process of *construction* and *exposition* that must be considered crucial procedures, already used by Kant in his theoretical work, namely in the case of mathematics and in the demonstration of space as *a priori* intuition.

VALENTINA SURACE holds a PhD in “Methods of philosophy” and is an assistant professor, in the field of Theoretical Philosophy at the Department of Ancient and Modern Civilizations at the University of Messina. She studies German philosophy of the twentieth century, in particular of Martin Heidegger, to whom she dedicated the book *L'inquietudine dell'esistenza. Le radici luterane dell'ontologia della vita di Martin Heidegger* (Mimesis 2014) and several essays and articles. In addition she is currently studying French philosophy, especially of Jacques Derrida, to whom she dedicated the essay *Messianismi e cosmopolitica: Derrida oltre Kant*, in: C. Resta (a cura di), *Schegge messianiche. Filosofia Religione Politica* (Mimesis 2017).

Abstract: Cosmopolitics in the Global age. Derrida beyond Kant

Globalization is the techno-economic form that today the whole globe has taken, that form is not an outward appearance, but a logical and ontological character, as diagnosed among others by Heidegger, Schmitt and Jünger. The process of globalization is, as suggested by Jacques Derrida, highly ambiguous: on the one hand, the technologies allow an unprecedented relationship between peoples, crossing borders, on the other hand, it triggers the dogged resistance of sovereign States, which try to seal their borders. There is no doubt that *Global Zeit* reflects the

Kantian philosophical project of a cosmopolitan order. I will try to explore the *limits* and the *conditions* of the possibility of Kantian cosmopolitanism, availing to Derrida, who made an important contribution to the rethinking of cosmopolitics in the global age. I think it is necessary to reactivate the heritage of Kantian cosmopolitanism, because globalization requires a radical rethinking of international law, but at the same time we must go *beyond* it, because it is insufficient.

BENJAMIN MUESER is a PhD candidate in political theory at Columbia University. His dissertation studies the development of the idea of a territorial ‘homeland’ in modern European political thought. He also writes on the normative conditions for the legitimate and exclusive possession of land.

Abstract: In Defense of First Occupancy: Permissive Law, Territorial Rights, and Particularity

This paper offers an update to the permissive theory of territorial rights. In this theory, the territory of states should be understood as a ‘permissive’ right, which can become conclusive only when all states work toward conditions of global reciprocity. This theory capitalizes on the Kantian notion that the original conditions of founding the state cannot be normatively queried. This paper, however, argues that in Kant’s ethical writings there are only limited circumstances in which the permissive law applies, and these are when unilaterally acquiring by first occupancy. In all other conditions, the material wrong of seizing what can be claimed by another, is also a formal wrong ‘in the highest degree’ by refusing to leave the state of nature. Interpreting this for the contemporary world means that we live in a ‘provisional present,’ in which we should adjudicate between histories of territorial possession.

II – Thursday, 11 October (Afternoon)

ROOM A1

ANTONELLA FOLIGNO Ph.D in Complexity Sciences in the Department of Basic Sciences and Foundations at the University of Urbino, with a dissertation on The Point Mass as a Model for Epistemic Representation. A Historical and Epistemological Approach. My research interest range between Philosophy and History of Science, focusing on Epistemology and Philosophy of Physics. Between 2016 and 2017 I was a Visiting Research Fellow at Utrecht University. I am also interested in Kant’s scientific tradition, particularly in the problem of space and time in mathematical-physics. I achieved my Master degree in 2014 with a thesis on the incongruent Counterparts argument.

Abstract: Foreshadowing Topology. Kant on the Nature of Space

This paper provides a novel reconstruction of the infamous incongruent counterparts argument which traces back to Kant. In particular it argues that the arguments allegedly supports two different conclusions, namely a negative one against the relationalist conception of space, and a positive one in favour of the alternative substantivalist conception. After that, the paper develops

two possible responses on behalf of the relationalist that undermine both the conclusions. It concludes by assessing whether a purely geometrical argument could ever suffice to vindicate a particular metaphysics of space over another.

MANJA KISNER (LMU Munich) obtained her PhD from LMU Munich in 2016. Her dissertation on the development of the notion of the will from Kant and German Idealists to Schopenhauer was published in 2016. She is now a postdoctoral researcher at LMU Munich and works on Kant's third *Critique*. In 2017 she was a visiting scholar at KU Leuven and in summer term 2018 at Brown University.

Abstract: The Peculiarity of Discursive Understanding in Kant's Transcendental Philosophy

Already in the first *Critique* Kant defines our understanding as a discursive understanding which plays a crucial role by the limitation of knowledge to appearances. In the third *Critique*, however, Kant's reference to the special character of our human discursive understanding is of relevance also for inquiring into the idea of the unity of nature (especially in §§ 76, 77). This is a point with which Kant goes one step further than in the first *Critique*: our discursive understanding is not only crucial for the limitation of knowledge to appearances, but also for explaining the relation between the whole and its parts. Hence, the task of the discursive understanding in the third *Critique* is to limit our knowledge about nature as a whole to our way of judging about it (KU, 5:408). As I will show in my presentation, this additional definition of the discursive understanding is of utmost importance for the extension of Kant's transcendental account in the third *Critique*.

HÉCTOR FERREIRO PhD in Philosophy (Humboldt University of Berlin, 2002). Since 2005 full-time Senior Researcher at the National Council for Science and Technology of Argentina. Since 2013 Director of the Research Programme on Classical German Philosophy at the Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina (Buenos Aires).

Abstract: On the Plausibility of Heidegger's Scholastic Interpretation of Kant's Concept of Existence

Heidegger links Kant's notion of "existence" and his correlative differentiation between "existence" and "reality" with the scholastic notion of "being" as distinct from "essence". Heidegger offers, further, a comprehensive analysis of the relation of Kant's conception of existence with the different doctrines of scholastic metaphysics on the kind of *distinction* between being and essence. The objective of my talk is to examine in detail Heidegger's claim that Kant's notion of existence is intrinsically related to the scholastic notion of being, and to evaluate the conceptual and exegetical plausibility of that claim. In this context I will try to make explicit specific aspects of Kant's theory of existence that supports Heidegger's interpretation.

JACINTO RIVERA DE ROSALES Jacinto Rivera de Rosales is Professor of History of Modern Philosophy at UNED (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Madrid, Spain). His field of research is classical German philosophy. His last book is *Fichte* (RBA, Barcelona, 2017). The last

article is "Attempt to introduce the concept of body into the Critique of Pure Reason", *Estudos kantianos*, 5.1 (2017), pp. 231-251.

Abstract: Materie und Substanz

The paper aims to study the first analogy of experience of the *Critique of pure reason*, where matter and substance of the appearances are examined. Why should change and persistence take place in the world? Is the reality in appearance (*realitas phaenomenon*) and its substance "entirely a sum total of mere relations"? What is transcendental matter? For Kant, force is a mark of the phenomenal substance, something that can be reconciled with today's physics.

ROOM A2

STANY MAZURKIEWICZ FNRS PhD student (philosophy) at the University of Liège, Belgium and the technical University of Dresden, Germany. Worked in Liège, Dresden and Padua. My research concerns Kant's and Hegel's relations to logic, language and mathematics.

Abstract: Kant and Algebraic Revolution

That the publication of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* constituted an intellectual revolution in the domain of theoretical philosophy is beyond any doubt. That this "Copernican Revolution" was contemporary of another one in the domain of mathematics seems to be less noticed. It is regularly said that the emergence of Non-Euclidean geometry in the first half of the 19th Century refuted the Kantian philosophical paradigm from the mathematical point of view. I will relativize this analysis and rather support that the problem of compatibility between Kantian philosophy and newest mathematics appeared much earlier, in Kant's life itself. This succession of events in the history of mathematics is what I call Algebraic Revolution.

LUIGI LAINO: has been Ph.D. awarded in 2013, with a dissertation on the philosophy of science of Ernst Cassirer (Università degli studi di Napoli Federico II). He has published many essays on the philosophy of physics and on Cassirer's thought, as well as on the question of technology and on philosophical anthropology. He has also written a monograph upon the ancient science and astronomy, focusing on the question of the mathematization of nature.

Abstract: Kant's Concept of Possibility and its Application to Contemporary Physics

The aim of the talk is to show the validity of the transcendental approach for modern physics. I particularly deal with the question of the refutation of the a priori, experienced both in analytical ontologies and in the philosophy of quantum gravity. As far as the first point is concerned, I am going to show that if there is a basic freedom in setting the features of the different categories, the concept of synthesis must be premised in the choice; in respect of the second question, I am conversely going to explain that space and time have to be assumed in advance in the construction of the mathematical scheme of experience allowed by loop quantum gravity, since one still face functions of coordination, which are thought to be prior to any empirical fulfilment of

the theory. As a consequence, I am going to demonstrate that “possibility” is the very premise of the physical concept of reality.

MICHAEL CUFFARO is a postdoctoral research fellow of the Rotman Institute of Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario and an external member of the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy at LMU Munich. He has published on topics in the philosophy of science, history of philosophy of science, general philosophy of science, and legal and political philosophy. His work mainly concerns both contemporary and historical aspects of questions relating to the structure of our theoretical knowledge, the presuppositions implicit in theoretical practice, and in the relations between different theories.

Abstract: Comparing Ernst Cassirer’s and Grete Hermann’s Views on Quantum Mechanics

In this talk I compare the views of two Neo-Kantian philosophers: Grete Hermann (1901-1984) and Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), both of whom commented on the impact of quantum mechanics for Kantian philosophy in the early part of the last century. For Cassirer, the lesson of quantum mechanics for Kantian philosophy is that the progress of physics has shown us that we must transcend the old Kantian categories and principles for the possibility of experience. For Hermann, in contrast, the Kantian philosophical framework, including the Kantian principles for objective cognition, remains valid but only in a relativised sense; quantum phenomena cannot be described objectively apart from the conditions under which they are actually apprehended by us in particular concrete cases.

REBEKKA GERSBACH Rebekka Gersbach studied philosophy and economics in Basel and London. From 2009 until 2012 she was a scientific researcher in a graduate program at the University of Bern. In 2013 she completed her doctorate at the University of Leipzig. She is currently a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Leipzig. Her areas of research are: theory of action and practical reasoning, philosophy of economics, and moral philosophy.

Abstract: Kant As a Source for Rethinking Economic Rationality

When we think about economic rationality, Kant is certainly not the first philosopher who comes to mind. In my talk, however, I want to propose three points we can learn from Kant in thinking about economic rationality: (1) While we find the idea of maximization in Kant’s concept of the imperative of prudence, he at the same time rejects it as a principle of practical reason and argues that it is only an ideal of the imagination. (2) The legal relation as developed in the doctrine of right can be read as a framework to think about strategic/economic interaction which then receives a normative foundation through the principle of right. However, it becomes clear in his discussion of a contract that Kant rejects the individualism that is inherent in theories of strategic interaction. (3) In locating the idea of economic rationality in the imperative of prudence and in the doctrine of right, it becomes clear that we must raise the question how it relates to the categorical imperative and to virtue and with this how it fits into a unified account of practical reason.

ROOM A3

SANEYUKI YAMATSUTA is associate professor at Nagoya University of Commerce and Business. He studies philosophy in Tokyo, Vienna and Mainz, and completed Ph.D. in 2013 at University Tokyo with the work about Kant's practical philosophy.

Abstract: **Moral Law as Pure Desire. Lacanian Interpretation of Kant's Ethics**

In my presentation I will try to reconstruct Jacques Lacan's highly original interpretation of Kantian ethics. According to Lacan, Kantian moral law is not purely rational principle which restricts human desires, but rather the highest desire itself. As the pure desire, the moral law becomes an "anti-weight" against sensual inclinations and makes moral action possible. In this interpretation Lacan concentrates especially on the concept of the "respect for the moral law" in Kant's moral philosophy, the concept, which several recent scholars of Kantian ethics paid great attention. From Lacanian perspective one can see the concept of the respect and Kantian ethics as whole in a new light.

EMANUELE TREDANARO PhD in Philosophy (2009) at University of Bologna and University of Marburg, and CNPq researcher at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (2012), I'm currently adjunct professor at the Federal University of Lavras, in Brazil. I'm experience in Kant's critical philosophy, with emphasis on: theory of knowledge and moral philosophy; subject, freedom and self-consciousness; Kant in contemporary ethics.

Abstract: **First Person and Humanity: The Constructivist Interpretation of Kant, Starting From *The Sources Of Normativity* by Christine Marion Korsgaard**

Korsgaard's theoretical proposal may perhaps be recognized as one of the most consistent contributions that the renewed attention to Kant and Kantianism produces within Anglo-Saxon reflection, at the turn of the last two centuries. As known, Korsgaard presents a first - and essentially definitive - systematization of her normative conception of morality, published under the title *The Sources of Normativity*. We want to highlight some issues that assume central relevance for Korsgaard in the normative foundation of morality, and, to some extent, turn around the relationship between the indispensability of the first person perspective and the prescriptivity of the concept of humanity. We will try to show how, by emphasizing Kant's signification of practical reason, Korsgaard rejects any possibility of a real separation between subjective motivation for action and objective rational normativity, underlining the character of the deliberation process that is, at the same time, constitutively – from practical point of view – authorial and public.

EWA WYRĘBSKA-ĐERMANOVIĆ Ewa Wyrębska-Đermanović studied Philosophy and International Relations in Łódź, Bonn and Providence. She obtained her PhD in Philosophy in 2015 at the University of Łódź, Poland, where she has worked as an adjunct. Since October 2018 she is a Postdoc Researcher at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Bayreuth, Germany.

Abstract: Kant's Pursuit of Wisdom and Fostering Moral Development

In Kant's thought the final goal of philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom, understood as accordance of reason with itself and moral perfection of an individual. The paper investigates various aspects of Kant's account of moral development as the process of obtaining wisdom. Firstly, there arises the problem of the evil with regard to human nature and the consequences of individual's final choice of principle in the said process. Secondly, one must reflect upon Kantian theory of upbringing as the part of becoming a moral person, which does not lay entirely on human freedom. Finally, the process of moralisation of human nature is not limited to an individual, but takes part in the history of the species and therefore the political dimension of external conditions for morality also need to be considered.

FEDERICA BASAGLIA I studied Philosophy at the University of Ferrara (Italy) and at the University of Marburg (Germany). I received my M.A. (2001) and Ph.D. (2009) in Philosophy from the University of Ferrara. Since 2010, I have a teaching and research position (as "akademische Mitarbeiterin") at the Philosophy Department at the University of Konstanz. Since the 2015/2016 academic year I teach Moral Philosophy at the University of Ferrara (as "professoressa a contratto").

Abstract: Compassion, Duties to the Self and Duties towards Animals

The Kantian argument for the existence of duties to animals is able to justify very strict moral obligations towards animals, for example, with respect to the prohibition of animal testing in case there are alternative methods. However, the Kantian argument for duties towards animals encounters a serious problem: whether it is possible to justify moral *duties to oneself*. Most contemporary philosophers think that there are no duties to the self. The problematic element of this concept is the coincidence of the legislating subject and the object of the moral obligation in the same person. In my paper, I will analyze the possibility of duties to the self, concentrating on those characteristics of these duties, which are in my opinion required in order to provide the Kantian argument for indirect duties regarding animals with a solid foundation.

JOHANNES NICKL is a Research Assistant at the University of Passau. He studied Philosophy, German and French Literature in Vienna and Passau. His main interests lie in the field of Kantian ethics and the Philosophy of German Idealism. In his PhD-thesis, he explores Kant's theory of conscience.

Abstract: The Cultivation of Feelings. Kant's Theory of Sympathy Meets Recent Moral Psychology

Recent scholarship in moral psychology emphasises the relevance of empathy as a key concept in moral agency. As other ethical theories seem to be highly compatible with the philosophy of empathy, Kantian ethics have hitherto been largely excluded from these debates. In my talk, I wish to shed some new light on the philosophical substance of Kant's theory of sympathy in order to point out its conceptual relevance for recent debates in moral psychology. In my interpretation, sympathy is a necessary condition in the transition from the representation of duty to a distinct morally required action as sympathy enables us to understand what it is like to be in another

person's situation. Once we sympathise, we become aware of other people's feelings, wishes and ends. Therefore, we are obliged to cultivate our sympathetic dispositions as they help us participate actively in other people's lives.

ROOM A4

LUCIANA MARTINEZ Luciana Martínez (UBA-CONICET) carried out her doctoral research at the University of Buenos Aires. The subject of this work is the kantian doctrine of definition, as it was developed between the *Preisschrift* of 1763 and the *Critique of Pure Reason*. She currently studies the kantian doctrine of genius in the same period.

Abstract: Kant's Doctrine of Genius at the End of the Silent Decade

The main purpose of this contribution is to discuss the modifications of the kantian doctrine of genius at the end of the silent decade, that means: at the late seventies. As during this decade Kant didn't publish any text, our investigation focuses on unpublished sources. We primarily analyse some reflections and classnotes on Logic, Metaphysics, Philosophical Encyclopedia and Anthropology. We also take into account the handbooks that were chosen by the Philosopher for bringing his lectures (Meier, Baumgarten, Feder).

JOÃO LEMOS is PhD in Philosophy and member of the Institute of Philosophy of University of Porto, Portugal. In 2017-2018 he developed a post-doctoral research on taste at São Paulo State University, UNESP, Brazil, right after having stayed in the USA, as a visiting scholar of New York University, NYU, with the support of the Fulbright Commission.

Abstract: A Taste of Philosophy, Science and Politics

By means of making it explicit and developing the double process of cultivation, exercitation and correction of taste and of sharpening the power of judgment, it is my first aim to make it evident its relevance with respect to philosophy, science and politics. To feed, to practice, to adjust taste, corresponds, in a wider sense, to better prepare the one who judges to pass deliberately correct judgments. My second goal is to show the proximity between the judgment of taste, as an actualization of the formal condition of the power of judgment, and the most critical way of thinking – and, so, to reassess the relevance

CÉCILE ANGELINI obtained a doctoral degree from the Université Catholique de Louvain (Belgium). Her thesis – defended in March 2018 – reflects on the artistic judgment and on the contemporary French resonances of Kantian aesthetics. Her current research focuses on the philosophical problems raised by the unprecedented modes of expression of contemporary art.

Abstract: The Contemporary Antinomy of Taste

How to judge? This question, already present in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* by Immanuel Kant, was updated in France in the early 1990s, when the *Esprit* and *Télérama* journals dedicated some issues to what was called a “crisis” in contemporary art, namely the supposed loss

of normative criteria allowing one to evaluate artworks. Following their publication, several French philosophers – among which Yves Michaud, Gérard Genette, Jean-Marie Schaeffer, and Rainer Rochlitz – took part in a public debate on judgment, which more or less explicitly centered on the third *Critique*, in terms similar to those employed by Kant himself in 1790. Underlining the specificity of this debate – which could be defined as a *new Antinomly of Taste* –, this conference intends to (re)examine the issue of the judgments on works of art, by establishing a dialogue between Kantian aesthetics and contemporary artistic philosophical discourses and practices.

WALTER ROMERO MENON is professor of department of Philosophy in the Federal University of Paraná-Brasil. UFPR. His main research area is Contemporary Aesthetics, Philosophy of Art, Philosophy of Technique and History of Philosophy.

Abstract: The Notion of Technique in The Third Critique

It is in the critique of the Judgment that Kant will deal with a notion of “technique of nature”, considering reason as a hypothetical cause and thus enabling the attribution of purpose to nature. Kant will describes nature with two techniques: a formal one that directly refers to the notion present in the agreement between understanding and imagination, characteristic of the judgment of taste, and another, real or plastic, linked to the teleological judgment that presupposes the connection between cause and effect. My purpose is to analyze the centrality of the idea of nature as an artifact in the resolution of the antinomy between causal determination and moral action through the faculty of reflective judgment in the first part of the Critique of the Judgment.

ROOM A5

THOMAS MERTENS Radboud University Nijmegen (The Netherlands). T.Mertens@jur.ru.nl

Abstract: Defamation in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals

It is generally presumed that Kant holds ‘freedom of speech’ in high regard. Still, his philosophy of law is relatively silent with regard to what counts as speech and what as a violation of one’s freedom of speech. This is especially the case with regard to defamation. In this paper, I will look at what Kant has to say about this: is it merely an object of moral disapproval or a reason to start a legal action as well?

MONIQUE HULSHOF is Professor of Ethics at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Campinas (UNICAMP). She received her doctorate in Philosophy from the University of São Paulo (USP) in 2011. Her research areas are Kant's practical philosophy and feminist theory. Her research is funded by a FAPESP Regular Grant (2018-2019).

Abstract: Practical Reason and Autonomy in Kant and the Feminist Reading of Benhabib and Allen

The Kantian concepts of practical reason and autonomy have been recovered in the contemporary debate of normative criteria based on which it would be possible to ground or at least justify

moral and political actions. In the context of feminist critical theory, these concepts have been taken up particularly by Seyla Benhabib and Amy Allen. In my paper, I intend to reconstruct how both of them return to these Kantian concepts, in order to understand in which extent their philosophical projects are related to Kant's practical philosophy. Then I will present a reading of Kant's concepts of practical reason and autonomy which could contribute to this debate.

ILEANA BEADE Ph.D., Philosophy and Ph.D. Political Sciences (Universidad Nacional de Rosario. Argentina). Master's degree in Social Sciences (FLACSO, Costa Rica). She works as a Researcher at the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET). She specializes in Kant's Political and Juridical Philosophy.

Abstract: Kant y Bayle en torno a la tolerancia y la religión privada

The question of religious tolerance, widely debated among modern philosophers since the Lutheran Reformation, gains relevance in the current context, as a result of the complex challenges imposed by multiculturalism within the frame of liberal democracies. Under different perspectives, Pierre Bayle and Immanuel Kant criticize religious fanaticism, report its disastrous consequences, and point out the relationship between rationality and tolerance. In this paper I analyze one important aspect raised by both philosophers in their discussion of the principle of tolerance, that is: freedom of conscience, a topic which reveals not only a political meaning, but also an epistemic one, as directly connected with the problem of the scope and limits of religious knowledge.

GIANLUCA SADUN BORDONI Place and date of birth: Rome, August 15, 1956. Current Position: Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Teramo, Italy. Ph.D in Philosophy, La Sapienza University, Rome 1992. Awarded Senior Research Fellowship at King's College in London (May-September 2013). Visiting Researcher at the Boston University, July-August 2015. DAAD Fellowship at the University of Trier (October-December 2017). Recent Publications: 1784, l'année fatidique, in L'année 1784: Droit et Philosophie de l'Histoire, edited by M. Rufing e S. Grapotte, Vrin, Paris 2017 ; I. Kant, Lezioni sul diritto naturale, edited by N. Hinske and G. Sadun Bordoni. Introduction by G. Sadun Bordoni, Bompiani, Milan 2016.

Abstract: Kant and Political Realism

The evolution of the international system suggests the necessity of a new reading of Kant's international thought, not conditioned – as it has been in the last decades - by the 'spirit' of the post- WW II age, which is probably over. The goal of the paper is to favour a reappreciation of the realistic elements of Kant thinking about international relations and international law, his debt to Hobbes and the complexity of his analysis of the balance of power among states, which is the core of 'classical realism', ancient and modern.

MARCELO DE AZEVEDO GRANATO 40 years, lawyer, living in São Paulo, Brazil. Doctor of Law – University of Turin, Italy, Doctor of Law – University of São Paulo, Brazil.

Abstract: A “insociável sociabilidade” na perspectiva kantiana de uma história universal

The paper examines the “unsociable sociability” in Kant’s *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim*. Starting from the role Kant expressly attributes to it, of leading an (ethical-)legal progress in history, unsociable sociability is discussed as (i) item of an idea, in Kantian sense, and as (ii) a concrete phenomenon. This entails a new understanding of its role, in which it is not *the responsible*, but is *compatible* with the progress delineated in the *Idea*. Thus the *Idea* will no longer represent a course of the world which *alone* justifies moral duty, but a call for human morally motivated integration to the process it depicts.

ROOM A6

MACARENA MAREY is Full Time Researcher at CONICET-UBA. She teaches Political Philosophy at the University of Buenos Aires. She has published several pieces on Kant’s practical and political philosophy.

Abstract: Kant’s Concept of Popular Sovereignty

Kant’s normative concept of popular sovereignty is, I will hold, of extreme importance today for two main reasons: it does not collapse into the mere empirical assertion of power by modern, (post-) Westphalian nation states, and it does not necessarily clashes with international, transnational and cosmopolitan political-juridical realms, and that is able to play normative roles facing globalization. On the contrary, it works as a normative principle to regulate those practical contexts. Following a line opened by Katrin Flikschuh, I will argue there is no dilemmatic tension in Kant’s concept of sovereignty. I propose that not only are international Right and cosmopolitan Right parts of a complete system of public Right, but also that this system has popular sovereignty as its pivotal stone.

PAOLA ROMERO (born in Caracas, Venezuela) is currently a PhD candidate in Political Theory at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She specializes in Kant’s political and moral philosophy, with a broader interest in the history of political thought, specifically on Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. Her Doctoral thesis focuses on the role of political conflict and its significance for an account of political agency in Kant.

Abstract: Kant and Political Conflict

In this paper I defend the thesis according to which Kant appealed to teleology as a way to explain the ordering of conflict in human experience. The challenge for Kant was to explain how conflict could be channel in a lawful and non-arbitrary way. I propose to read Kant’s political teleology works from the perspective of two mechanisms. On the one hand, the “Nature wills it so” argument is meant to order our hostile condition by outsourcing moral agency to Nature. On the other hand, the “Counter acting” model is meant to work with an open-ended conception of ends, by means of the unsocial sociability of human beings. The upshot of this analysis is two-fold: on the one hand, it provides evidence of the centrality of conflict in Kant’s political theorizing; on the

other, it raises fundamental questions about the limits and scope of Kant's account of political agency.

JOEL THIAGO KLEIN is Professor at Federal University of Santa Catarina (Brazil) and Editor of *Studia Kantiana* (the journal of Brazilian Kant Society). He is also a fellow from Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and a researcher from CNPq (Brazilian research foundation).

Abstract: Kant and the Idea of Intergenerational Justice

The paper will present a proposal of a Kantian theory of intergeneration justice. Going with Kant and beyond Kant, the proposal of a Kantian theory of intergenerational justice can be grounded in two principles. One the one hand, it is grounded in the very idea of a Kant's philosophy of history as a practical oriented project, one the other hand, in the idea of a system of rights which must be teleologically realized, in particular regarding the notions of property and democratic institutions.

ANGELA TARABORRELLI (Ph.D. Università La Sapienza) teaches Political Philosophy at the Università di Cagliari. Her research spans modern (Hobbes, Locke, Shaftesbury, Kant) and contemporary political philosophy (Arendt and Nussbaum). She is the editor of the Italian translation of Shaftesbury's *Characteristicks* (2007), and the author of two books on cosmopolitanism: *Dal cittadino del mondo al mondo dei cittadini. Saggio su Kant* (2004) and *Contemporary cosmopolitanism* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). Currently, her research interests are focused on migration and integration issues.

Abstract: Space in Kant's Political Philosophy

In this paper I will focus on the notion of space in Kant's political philosophy. Unlike what is claimed by some authors of the so-called "spatial turn", such as Henry Lefebvre (1974), and with the aim of highlighting an aspect of Kant's thought that has been neglected, I will argue that in his philosophy space is not only conceptualized as an *a priori* form of sensibility, but also as an *object* of politics and as a *place* of politics.

I will also show that his *political* notion of space can help illuminating some issues at the centre of contemporary debate on migration, such as the relationship between sovereignty and borders and the right to freedom of movement.

TOMMASO MORAWSKI is currently a postdoctoral fellow at the Biblioteca Hertziana – Max Planck Institut für Kunstgeschichte. In 2017, he obtained his PhD in Philosophy and History of Philosophy at Sapienza – Università Sapienza di Roma with a dissertation on *La questione dell'ordine spaziale nel pensiero di Kant. Logica, estetica, orientamento*. His major research foci include German Enlightenment, philosophy of migration, history and philosophy of cartography, media theory and geo-philosophy. Since 2017 he collaborates with the Culture programs of the Goethe-Institut in Rome, CiEG (Cattedra Internazionale Emilio Garroni) and the journal *Pòlemos. Materiali di filosofia e critica sociale*.

Abstract: Kant e il senso globale del luogo. Osservazioni per una geo-filosofia della globalizzazione

The localization of identities and the local meaning of cultures are becoming more and more important themes, especially due to the increasing geographical extension of the social, economic and political relations. Yet, if it is true that today the speed and intensity of global interconnections has grown, it is also true that such interrelations are not new. This is the fundamental point I plan to discuss in my paper: to approach the relation between place, culture and identity through a focused historical analysis of the global sense of place. A work plan which finds in the Enlightenment, the first phenomenon to be national *and* local *and* international, a perfect testbed. I will focus my attention on the figure of Immanuel Kant, whose work illustrates at best how the geographical processes of global exploration, oceanic navigation and terrestrial encounter, prompted new forms of planetary awareness and geo-literary consciousness.

III – Friday, 12 October (Morning)

ROOM A1

DAVID FORMAN is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA.

Abstract: Kantian Critique and the History of Philosophy

Kant derides those “for whom the history of philosophy ... is itself their philosophy” (4:255). But such complaints should not blind us to the fact that Kant’s critical philosophy is *oriented toward the history of philosophy as a philosophical problem*. Kant identifies the endless quarrel of the philosophical sects as the historical condition for the emergence of a critique of pure reason, which promises to serve as the only legitimate tribunal for their competing claims. And the philosophy of the future proceeds, accordingly, not by ignoring the historical sects or seeking simply to replace them, but rather by properly comprehending and only thereby superseding them. In this way, Kant’s critical philosophy can be seen as a realization of the Enlightenment ideal of an anti-dogmatic “eclecticism” that eschews allegiance to any particular sect and hence seeks to engage critically with the history of philosophy.

ANTON KABESHKIN is a PhD student at Johns Hopkins University, Department of Philosophy. His research interests are primarily focused on Kant and post-Kantian Idealists, especially on their philosophy of nature. He is currently writing a dissertation on Hegel’s logic and philosophy of nature.

Abstract: Kant and Hegelian Natural Theology

In this paper I investigate the meaning and justification of Kant’s claim that strictly everything in the organism must be regarded as purposive in accordance with a regulative principle. I consider the connection between this claim and Kant’s suggestion that we must judge natural purposes as

grounded in the reflectively postulated idea God. I further question whether this part of Kant's account presents a challenge for the attempts to find a naturalistic account of biological functions in Kant. I then look for resources that would help meeting this challenge both in Kant himself and in Hegel. Finally, I briefly consider Hegel's account of the role of objective concepts both at the purely logical and at the natural-philosophical levels. Because of the separation between these two levels, Hegel is able to account for the teleological make-up of organisms while maintaining that not all of their features are purposive.

MONICA CARBO I RIBUGENT studied Philosophy at the University of Barcelona, and promoted with a PhD at the University of Girona with an essay about the influence of Kant's Critique of Judgment on the poetical thinking of Hölderlin and Coleridge. She is at present an associate professor of Philosophy at the Department of Paedagogy in the University of Girona. Her academical field of interest is German Philosophy of the XIXth and XXth century and specifically philosophical approaches involving aesthetical issues.

Abstract: The Hermeneutical Import of Kant's Account of Imagination, Judgment and Experience
Imagination stands as the genuine faculty of (re)presentation in a strict sense, it allows representing an object, primarily in its presence, though even in the absence of it, throughout an unconscious performance. Kant leaves us without further explanation of how exactly imagination performs its own genuine function. In this respect, imagination parallels the power of judgment about which, in the Doctrine of Transcendental Schematism Kant is led to conclude the passage in which he sets out this problem with the suggestion that the power of judgment depends for its security on "a particular talent" about which he finds he can say very little. This paper will examine the internal connection of imagination and judgment as pivotal for a proper elucidation of the notion of experience in the Kantian endeavor to provide a most ambitious account of human experience as a meaning oriented activity.

GREGOR FLOCK is an independent systematic philosopher from Vienna, Austria, who is loosely associated with the Institute of Philosophy in Vienna. His two current areas of specialization are ontology (or metaphysics) and the philosophy of perception. Building on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, he generally defends neo-Kantian idealist and physical antirealist positions.

Abstract: Kant, Schopenhauer, Sellars and the Myth of the Given

Wilfrid Sellars (1991) and his followers such as McDowell (1996) reject a perceptually "given" as a "myth." In this talk I show how Sellars and followers inappropriately deviate from Kant's (CPR) and moreso Schopenhauer's (1816) still highly viable proto moderate foundationalist conceptions of such a given or nonconceptual perceptual content and how, secondly, Sellars and followers incur their epistemological problems as a direct result of classically foundationalist misconceptions and of deviating from such a Kantio-Schopenhauerian "given manifold." More specifically and in order to correct these mistakes, I first go back to Kant's given and related key concepts and explicate them to some extent. I then briefly show how Schopenhauer had already implemented these improvements and how this is being picked up in the contemporary literature. I lastly refute

Sellars' Myth of the Given and the too conceptualist classical foundationalism on which it rests, instead replacing them with more nonconceptualist moderate foundationalism and an unconscious inferences as well as "Modus Ponens Model of Cognitive Perception" based explanation for perceptual conceptual content, direct (aspects of) objects of perception and our perceptual basic beliefs.

ROOM A2

CLAUDIA JÁUREGUI is Professor of Modern Philosophy at the University of Buenos Aires since 2000 and Researcher of the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas of Argentina since 1998. She has published several academic articles and books on Kantian Philosophy.

Abstract: The Resolution of the Antinomy of the Teleological Judgment: Can We Assert that the Intelligent World-Cause Has an Intuitive Understanding?

In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant underlines that all appearance of an antinomy between the mechanical maxim and the teleological maxim rests on confusing a fundamental principle of the reflecting with that of the determining power of judgment. Nevertheless, it seems that the complete resolution of the conflict does not simply consist in the detection of this confusion. Kant often remarks that the principle of the unification of the two principles must be placed in the supersensible. The aim of the work I am presenting is to examine this second aspect of the resolution of the antinomy. In this context, I particularly intend to elucidate to what extent the reference to an intuitive understanding can be considered an enlargement of the concept of an intelligent cause of the world that is productive in accordance with intentions.

NATALIA LERUSSI has obtained the degree of Doctor in Philosophy from the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (Argentine) with a work about Kant's philosophy of history. Nowadays she is assistant professor of modern philosophy at the Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentine) and researcher of CONICET, the Research Council of this country (with a project entitled: *Kant, Fichte and the analogy between Reason and Life*).

Abstract: Kant on the Question of the Reference of Teleology to Organisms

In the paper I discuss Kant's justification for judging organized beings (or organisms) in teleological terms, through the concept of the "end" or "natural end". Nowadays there are different answers to this question. For instance, from the perspective of what I call the "objective point of view", organized beings have some objective characteristics that justify us having to comprehend them teleologically, while from that of what I call the "ordinary subjective viewpoint", we must do so only on account of the discursive character of our understanding. I argue that both positions are, for different reasons that I outline, misleading, and I offer my own answer, a refined subjective position. By means of the distinction between the "essential character" of our understanding, on the one hand, and its "limits", on the other, I hope to give a consistent and well-supported in the sources answer to the question why organized beings must be judged teleologically: that is, to the question of the reference of teleology to organisms.

JULIA MUÑOZ is a PhD student at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, UNAM, in Mexico. She has been part of both international and national research projects, in which she has developed her interests on Kant's philosophy and its contemporary discussions. Her current

research is focused on the epistemic relevance of error and disagreement in Kant's theoretical philosophy.

Abstract: Kant on the Relation Between Disagreement and Rationality

In this paper, I argue that, for Kant, disagreement is not an epistemic failure but rather a condition for rationality. I will argue that the *sensus communis* maxims function as logical rules that prescribe how disagreement should be coordinated in order to be useful for the assessment of judgments' validity. These maxims: (1) think for oneself, (2) think oneself in the position of someone else, and (3) think in agreement with oneself, provide us with a structure in which disagreement becomes not a failure, but a touchstone for the justification of judgments. According to this view, disagreement can be understood as a fundamental aspect of rationality, because it allows us to see that rationality is not reducible to mere individuals but pertains to a plurality that must deal with divergent points of view, and that has to work with these differences towards a common goal.

NATALIA DANILKINA earned her PhD in philosophy from Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University. She studied Neo-Kantianism, post-Kantian social philosophy and contemporary ethics and worked in the intersection of philosophy and social sciences. The reception of Kant in Eastern Europe is one of her special research interests within the Dutch Research School of Philosophy.

Free Will and Uncertainty: Kant's Thinking about the Future

Abstract: Free Will and Uncertainty: Kant's Thinking about the Future

In this paper, I explore how the normative account of "what ought to be" is squared with the probabilistic account of "what is the likeliness of something to happen". According to Kant, free will turns is the reason of our uncertainty about moral progress of people, both in individual and collective terms. However, neither the lack of knowledge about future world, nor our uncertainty about our movement to the better plays a role for our conduct. Kant's thinking about the future mirrors the so-called Precautionary Principle at risk, which says: the lack of knowledge of possible negative effects does not prevent us from acting in a way reducing the possible evil (harm).

ROOM A3

DANIELA ALEGRIA is a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile and at the Complutense University of Madrid. M.A. in Philosophy at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile and B.A in Philosophy at the University of Chile.

Abstract: Kant and the Personal Relationships: Some Critical Remarks

The impartialist moral theory of Kant has been accused by care ethicists as being a moral theory incapable of paying attention to situations in which personal relationships are involved. The hypothesis of this paper is the following: although the claims of partiality of the defenders of the care ethicists are legitimate, the ethics of care is not a radically opposed alternative to the Kantian

ethics. In fact, the closer the relation is with a given person, the more strict my duties are with him or her. The duties of love presuppose a dimension of partiality that Kant accepts and justifies.

LAURA HERRERO OLIVERA works as teacher at the Complutense University , Madrid since 2014. She has studied in this University and researched in the Freie University (Berlin) and the University of Tübingen. Her PhD deals with freedom in Kant and the unity of reason. She has also worked in the Spanish Bioethics Committee and devoted some time to research in this field.

Abstract: Lying From a Kantian Perspective

Firstly, I would like to expose some relevant concepts, such as hypocrisy, that can hinder a new metaphysics to achieve the real path of science. It parallels arrogance of knowledge or the way in which its limits are not taken into account. In ‘On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns’ Kant distinguishes between doing harm (*nocet*) to another, from doing wrong to (*laedit*) another. He considers the former as an accident; in the case that harm derives from a true proposition, it is caused by casualty. In some of the notes by Mongrovia very different considerations can be read: “As long as people are not fully moralized, it will be preferable not to be fully sincere”. Secondly, I pose three questions regulated, in the Kantian sense of the term, by these concepts. As a conclusion, I would like to stress the role of sincerity (and not truth) as opposed to that of the act of lying.

LUIGI FILIERI I am PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of Pisa and research fellow at the Italian Institute for Philosophical Studies (IISF-Naples). During my PhD I have been VRF at Brown University and at the Goethe-Universität Frankfurt. I am currently Editorial Assistant for the journal «*Studi Kantiani*». My research is focused on Kant’s thought, the development of post-Kantian systems and the philosophy of Ernst Cassirer.

Abstract: Law, Postulate and Will: Kant on Freedom

The aim of my paper is to argue that freedom is 1) *not only* a postulate but rather, essentially, 2) an unconditioned form of causality endowed with the shape of a law and exercised by the will. By this I mean that the absolute spontaneity of the “fact of reason” is, by Kant, framed into a normative necessitation. In other words, the absolute spontaneity of the “fact of reason” is transformed by Kant into an unconditioned law. On the other hand, however, I do not claim that freedom as a postulate is something completely different from this law but, on the contrary, that the necessitation provided by freedom as a law and performed by the will leads to the postulate of freedom as something needed for practical grounds.

ROOM A4

ALBERTO PIRNI Researcher (tenure track) and Lecturer in Public Ethics at the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies – Pisa. He spent research periods by the Universities of Tübingen and Freiburg i.Br. and was visiting professor by several Universities in Spain, Germany, Russian Federation,

Brazil and Argentine. Main research fields involve: Kant and Classical German philosophy, contemporary political and social philosophy, public ethics, ethics of technology. The complete list of his publications is available here: <https://www.santannapisa.it/en/alberto-eugenio-ermenegildo-pirni>

Abstract: Kant as Ante Litteram Theorist and Critic of the Moral Enhancement

Could Kant be considered as a precursor of the moral enhancement and, in any case, a reference-scholar within the present-day debate about such a topic? In order to give an answer to that question, the paper develops a twofold path. On the one hand, it deals with the implicit idea of “enhancement” that the same pure practical reason offers to the natural inclination of the being capable of reason. On the other hand, the paper explores the possibility of being enhanced “from outside”, namely, through two big families of possible enhancements in the present day already (even if partially) at our disposal: the pharmacological forms of enhancement and those promised by calculators or artificial intelligence devices. Finally, the paper addresses the Kantian idea of autonomy and the capability of being the conscious starting point of a series of effects, which is undoubtedly challenged by such possibility of artificial – or at least not-natural – improvements for the moral agency of individuals.

MARGIT RUFFING is senior lecturer at the philosophy department of Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, since 2002 managing editor of *Kant-Studien*, since 2014 temp. director of Kant-Forschungsstelle. Papers and talks concentrating on Schopenhauer and Kant:
<https://www.blogs.uni-mainz.de/fb05philosophie/arbeitsbereiche/neuzeit/mitarbeiter/mruffing/publikationen/>

Abstract: The Possibility and Reality of “Moralization”: Kant’s Idea of Necessary Moral Progress

Inasmuch as it belongs to Kant’s theory of moralization, the concept of progress is determined by the “transcendental” conditions of the possibility of the human moral disposition [Gesinnung], which is based on the predisposition [Anlage] to the good. At the same time, Kant’s theory of reason’s historical development is more closely tied to experience than other parts of his theory of right. What we are particularly interested in is the ambiguity of Kant’s position: while he is aware of the human being’s evident, continuous failure to become fully moralized, he nonetheless maintains a reasonable conviction in the moral progress of humanity, thus arriving at a view that is true to human life.

GIORGIA CECCHINATO has a PhD in Philosophy from the Ludwig Maximilians Universitaet Muenchen. She is a professor at the Philosophy’s Department of the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais and works mostly in the field of German Idealism, Aesthetics and Modern Philosophy.

Abstract: The Duty to Agree and the Necessity to Disagree. On Kant’s Concept of *Sensus Communis* in the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*

My objective is to present a possibility of reading the normativity of the *sensus communis* that makes it possible to maintain the transcendental point of view and at the same time to extend the horizon of its relevance and its reach in Kant’s system. I do not intend to argue that the Kantian foundation of the *sensus communis* is linear and perfectly clear. There are problems, but my suggestion is that Kant himself suggests the departure from circles in which the grounding of the sharing of judgments of taste falls. The failures are productive. But it is a question of adopting a different perspective that considers not only the relation of taste to the conditions of knowledge

of objects, but which focuses more on its insertion in an ideal horizon of realization and perfection of humanity. Therefore, the axis of reflection is significantly displaced from a perspective that privileges relations with the *Critique of Pure Reason*, both with the *Analytic* and with the *Dialectic*, to one that dialogues with the *Critique of Practical Reason* and, above all, opens interesting perspectives to make a connection with the *Metaphysics of Customs*. The *sensus communis* is something that "we must produce in us". It is precisely this kind of duty that I will try to justify.

FERNANDO MANUEL FERREIRA DA SILVA Post-Doctoral fellow of the Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon. PhD in 2016, on Novalis' critique of identity. Chief concerns: Kantian Aesthetics and Anthropology, German Idealism and Romanticism, in authors such as Kant, Fichte, Novalis, or Hölderlin. Main publications: '*The poem of the understanding is philosophy. Novalis and the art of self-critique*', in Mimesis Verlag, Germany (t. b. p. in 2019); «“Das Unsterbliche mit dem Sterblichen zu verbinden”; «Um “secreto procedimento da alma dos homens”: Kant sobre o problema das representações obscuras», in Con-textos Kantianos, 2017.

Abstract: Between *Egoism* and *Pluralism*: Kant and the Problem of the Logical-Aesthetic Nature of the Pragmatic I

We know today Kant's importance in founding modern Anthropology; we also know that Kant undertakes this by excising Anthropology from a metaphysical trunk, and that instead of inoculating it in another trunk, Kant rather singularly replants it *in a different soil, through a different method, as its own self-sufficient trunk*. Not so widely known, however, is the *new position* of this science. For, according to Kant, such a transplantation did not mean its isolation. Quite on the contrary, Anthropology is the ante-chamber of man's self-knowledge, and this makes it not a dissociating, rather an *agglutinating* pole of the surrounding branches of knowledge. Now, among such branches, two singularly exemplify this process: one which seems detached from Anthropology – that of *Logic* – and one which is now part of the Anthropology, that of *Aesthetics*. There is, of course, a singular relation between these three fields of knowledge. And so our question is: *what is the relation of Anthropology to philosophical logic (and hence, to the critique) and to philosophical aesthetics?* What aspirations may Anthropology have in fulfilling one of Kant's main designs: that of *uniting such opposites and thereby claim the superior dignity of the science of man?* The answer(s) to this, we believe, reside in Kant's proposition of a new I and the I's new pragmatic vision. Namely, Kant proposes an *I in the world*, an alternative, for dual, or plural form to the I's egoism, one which at once seeks to satisfy the claims of Logic, by *knowing itself and the world*, and those of Aesthetics, by *experiencing pleasure in its knowledge of itself and its species in the world*. This pluralism, we hope to prove, is to be seen not only as a factor of necessary distinction, but also as a factor of possible union between that which separates Logic and Aesthetics: logical egoism and aesthetic egoism.

IV – Friday, 12 October (Afternoon)

ROOM A2

ANJA PICHL is a PhD student at Bielefeld University in the DFG research training group 2073 *Integrating Ethics and Epistemology of Scientific Research*. After completing her M.A. in Philosophy at LMU Munich she worked in the Bavarian research network *Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells (ForIPS)* as a research fellow at the ethics institute TTN at LMU Munich 2014-2017.

Abstract: Kantian Philosophy of Biology and Its Relevance for Philosophy of the Life Sciences

The talk firstly provides a short account of Kant's key insight into principle limits of reductionism in biology and the role of teleology in handling these limits. The reconstruction of Kant's thoughts will be related to present debates about limits of reductionism in biology and to concrete examples of current life science research: The machine concept of the organism prevailing in synthetic biology and certain stem cell concepts will be shown to be questionable in the light of Kant in two ways: Firstly in that the concept of the organism underlying many research strategies and application scenarios does not mind certain limits of reductionism in biology carved out by Kant and debated also in recent philosophy of biology. Secondly, I'll argue that the striving for control of biological entities sets narrower confines to actual life science research and its epistemic aims than the in-principle limits of reductionism related to biological organisation. Thus the Kantian *Critique of Teleological Judgement* throws a light on tensions between the aim (and limits) to achieve control over biological entities or processes and the aim (and limits) to understand them.

NATALIA ALBIZU is starting her PhD studies at Berlin's Free University, where her dissertation will focus on Kant's conception of space. Her main interests are in Kant and early modern philosophy. She also has a growing interest in the history and philosophy of mathematics, with side interests in phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and the philosophy of G. Deleuze.

Abstract: Spatial Directions and Geometrical Construction. On the Role of the Body in Kant's Account of Geometrical Cognition.

The aim of this presentation is to elucidate the meaning of Kant's assertion that one's own body is the Grundvorstellung in virtue of which we are able to draw all spatial figures. That assertion stems from a sheet from the period of the Opus posticum and is explicitly related to the argument from incongruent counterparts. I will argue that it is consistent with the different presentations of the argument and will try to make sense of it against that background. In the first part of the presentation, I will briefly lay out the argument from incongruent counterparts and explain the role that the body can be said to play in it. In the second part, I will put forth an explanation of the concrete function that the body has qua primal representation in geometrical construction.

ALOISIA MOSER is Assistant Professor at the Catholic Private University in Linz, Austria. She got a Ph.D. at the New School for Social Research and conducted her post-doc studies at UC Berkeley and at the Forschungskolleg *Analytic German Idealism* at the University of Leipzig. Her book *Kant and Wittgenstein – A Groundwork for a Theory of the Act of Thinking* is to be published in 2019.

Abstract: Kant on Guessing

If you think Kant leaves no room for guesswork – think again! Guessing (*Raten*) plays a vital role in Kant. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant writes that reason presupposes the existence of cognitions of the understanding, which have a direct relation to experience, and aim at the ideal unity of these cognitions – a unity which far transcends all experience. But to achieve this ideal unity we have to guess or presuppose or assume quite a bit. I argue that Kant's account of guessing is later, in the *Critique of Judgment*, elaborated in utmost detail as teleological judgment. What we guess is a general law for given experience. Guessing has, however, a moment of arbitrariness. Only by finding a transcendental principle of guessing (e.g. the principle of the formal purposiveness of nature), the ideal unity of understanding and reason can be achieved. In short, we can only guess, but even this guessing can be guided by a priori laws.

ROOM A2

MARCO RUSSO is currently Associate Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Salerno (Italy). Taking into account the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical aspects, his main research topics concern the concepts of humanity and of world. 2011-2017 he has been vice president of “Helmut Plessner Gesellschaft”, an international network for the promotion of philosophical anthropology.

Abstract: Der Weltmann. Past and Future of a Kantian figure

The contribution proposes to consider the *Weltmann* as a central figure for understanding the setting of Kant's anthropology both in its relations with the European humanistic tradition and in its actuality. The *Weltmann* reworks the humanistic heritage by showing how to combine virtue and knowledge in a society that has lost the main frames of reference (religion, cosmos, spirit, tradition), has to deal with the neutral knowledge of science and, at the same time, with the different cultures emerged with the discovery of the new worlds. The worldly and pragmatic approach of the *Weltmann* helps to go beyond the formalism, rigorism and anti-naturalism which basically characterize the Kantian anthropology. In this way it also helps us to face the interweaving of epistemological, ethical and political problems that the “globalized world” produces.

CASSANDRA BASILE (Cassano allo Ionio, 1988) is currently doing a PhD in Philosophy at the University of Pisa. She graduated in theoretical philosophy, and her research interest are mainly focussed on Kant. She was editor of the work “I filosofi e la politica. Teoria e pratica a confronto” for ETS, and has published a number of articles on Kant concerning the relationship between truth

and falsehood; the issue of creation and harmony in the Third Critique, and the question of Transcendental Deception in the First Critique.

Abstract: Society-Theatre. Fiction, *Mimesis* and Unconscious in Kant

The aim of my paper is to bring to light the aspects of modernity that characterize Kantian thought, demonstrating that Kant is an avant-garde sociologist and an attentive reader of human nature. In particular, I would like to focus my attention on the analogical aspect characterizing the Kantian social description. Civil society is represented as a particular theatrical representation: comedy. The analogy established by Kant allows him to analyze the social situation and an individual's behaviour as if the latter were a carrier of masks. What I would like to show is the play of fiction-simulation/truth that men put into place and the way in which appearance can sometimes deceive others, by creating social deception at different levels. In this context, I also wish to demonstrate how it is possible to find an unconscious component directing human action and how man is actually unaware of this fact, although he thinks he is acting consciously in every field of his actions.

ROOM A3

CLAUDIO LA ROCCA is Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Genoa. He has published several volumes and numerous essays on Kant in Italian, English, French, German and Spanish. From 2006 to 2016 he was president of the *Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani*; currently he is vice-president of the Italian Society for Theoretical Philosophy. He is editor-in-chief of the journal «*Studi kantiani*».

Abstract: Enge und weite Pflichten und ihre Folgen

Kant's distinction between strict and large duties in the *Metaphysic of Morals* entails several problems, first of all its relationship with the further distinction Kant draws between perfect and imperfect duties. The paper aims to shed some light on this conceptual pair and to point out some consequences in the moral life which follow from it. Is it possible to conceive ethical duties which are at the same time perfect duties? In which way can the practical power of judgment play its role in the *Spielraum*, the free space that moral rules leave open for their application? Which is the logic structure of the deliberation process that takes place in this context?

ANSELMO APOTONE is associate professor of theoretical philosophy at the University of Rome "Tor Vergata". His publications on Kant's philosophy include *Erfahrung, Kategorien und Möglichkeit*, Roma 2012², *Gestalten der transzendentalen Einheit*, Berlin 2009, *Kant et le pouvoir réceptif. Recherches sur la conception kantienne de la sensibilité*, Paris 2014, as well as numerous articles.

Abstract: The “Obligation” (Sollen) and the Maxims of the Present

The processes of determination of individual and collective will according to the classical principles of the utilitarian or deontological type appear increasingly uncertain or arbitrary and allow

irrational derives in theory and practice. Kant instead recognizes a pure moral obligation that has to be fulfilled through an open and perfectible system of subjective rules or maxims that follow the general principle of practical reason, the moral law. The actor does not need to pretend "a world as it should be", which exists "only in his opinion" (Hegel), but he can, and has a duty (to try) to orientate and structure ethically his will and action in a concrete and non-contradictory way. In conclusion the Kantian perspective is illustrated in a brief discussion of two current topics of bioethics and politics.

ANTONINO FALDUTO is lecturer at the University of Halle (Germany) and Humboldt-Fellow at the University of St Andrews (UK). His work focuses on Classical German Philosophy and Scottish Enlightenment. His monograph "The Faculties of the Human Mind and the Case of Moral Feeling in Kant's Philosophy" is available as paperback.

Abstract: Magnanimity in Kant (and Schiller)

In my paper, I will argue against the idea that ugliness is necessarily to be found in human moral actions, as Kant describes them. In order to do this, I will present a critique of the early reception of Kant's moral philosophy, which connects Kantian ethics with something repugnant, by mostly concentrating on Friedrich Schiller's *Kallias Letters*. The main aim of my paper is that of distinguishing between the concept of "strength of soul" and the concept of "magnanimity" in Kant's work. By differentiating between these two concepts, I aim to show why strength of soul is required for every human moral action, while magnanimity consists only in a normative ideal and model for human beings.

ROOM A4

VIRGINIA FIGUEIREDO has a PhD in Philosophy from the Université des Sciences Humaines de Strasbourg. She is a professor at the Philosophy's Department of the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais and works mostly in the field of Aesthetics. In 2017, she published a book on Kant's Aesthetics, *Horizontes do Belo*, Editora da UFMG.

Abstract: Does a Genius Produce His Artworks Like an Apple Tree its Apples?

This paper addresses two issues: the first is the philosopher's fear of a lawless freedom of nature. Facing the possibility of chaos, he is terrified with the chance that *knowledge* becomes impossible. The second is a harder one, and it is related to the *modern* artist's (or genius) anguish. It is a technical or an artistical complaint. He finds no more given rules to create his artworks. I try to deal with these two issues by taking into account Kant's concept of purposiveness of nature as a regulative principle. The madness that threaten the genius is deeper than that of the philosopher. In order to treat the artist's pain, without having to abandon the connection between art and nature, that constitutes one of the most fruitful reading keys of Kant's Aesthetics, I resort to other ideas I found reading Lacoue-Labarthe and Hannah Arendt.

GABRIELE TOMASI is Associate Professor of Aesthetics at the University of Padova. His primary research areas are Kant, Wittgenstein, and modern and contemporary aesthetics. He has published numerous papers on Kant, Leibniz, Hume and Wittgenstein. His publications include *La bellezza e la fabbrica del mondo. Estetica e metafisica in G.W. Leibniz* (2002); *Ineffabilità. Logica, etica, senso del mondo nel 'Tractatus' di Wittgenstein* (2006); *Un bicchiere con Hume e Kant. Divertissement estetico-metafisico* (2010).

Abstract: Kantian Aesthetic Ideas and Artistic Depth

Profundity is a highly valued quality in a work of art. Usually we call “profound” an artwork that is revelatory of fundamental aspects of human nature, or of the world, or of our relation to it. Profound artworks deal with subjects like human freedom, the search for self-fulfilment, death, redemption, etc., in ways that enable us to see things that we missed to notice or that remind us of things that, though common and known, we tend to forget. Accordingly, it is claimed that from the encounter with a profound artwork we gain something like a deeper insight – moral or metaphysical – into how life is or might be. In my talk I will try to elaborate a bit this experience in the light of the Kantian notion of aesthetic ideas and the claim that, among other things, for beautiful art “spirit” is requisite (KU 5: 320).

ROOM A6

LAURA PAPISH is an assistant professor of philosophy at The George Washington University. Her main research areas are Kant’s moral theory and the history of ethics. Her articles have appeared in (among others) *Kantian Review*, *Social Theory and Practice*, and *Ergo*, and her first book, with Oxford University Press (2018), is titled *Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform*.

Abstract: Coercion and Kant’s League of Nations

My paper develops a new argument to defend Kant’s claim, in texts such as the *Doctrine of Right*, that a federative league of nations may not wield coercive power over member nations. The argument proceeds by attending closely to Kant’s description of the state as a “moral person” and the historical lineage of this term. This allows me to identify three different reasons why the moral personhood of states is such that coercive power cannot be used against them. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that even if a federation of nations enjoys only the smallest modicum of coercive power, such a league is necessarily despotic because this power cannot hit in a discriminate manner its intended target, namely another nation-state in its capacity as a distinct moral person.

MARITA RAINSBOROUGH holds a PhD from the University of Hamburg and teaches at the Leuphana University Lüneburg and the Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel. Her research focuses on French philosophy, the actuality of classical German philosophy, and intercultural philosophy. Her professorial dissertation will be published under the title *Foucault heute. Neue Perspektiven in Philosophie und Kulturwissenschaft*, Bielefeld 2018.

Abstract: Philosophy and Critique. The Critical Dialogue with Kant on Ethics and Politics in Contemporary African Philosophy

African philosophy as a critical project reflects and deliberates African development – “Africa in metamorphosis” (Serequeberhan 1991: 12). It is concerned with the task of creating an African identity, the theoretical working up of the African past, coping with the present especially in its political-social, cultural and ethical dimensions, and conceptualizing the African future in a global context. In this context African philosophy resorts again and again to Kant’s philosophy, both in a

hermeneutic process of decolonial reading of his works and as an inspiration for theoretical foundations, especially in moral and political terms.

ZACHARY VEREB is a fourth-year philosophy doctoral candidate at the University of South Florida. He is currently working on a dissertation on Kantian ethics and environmental philosophy, with an emphasis on the aesthetic, ethical, and political significance of Kant's thought for contemporary problems in environmentalism and the ethics of climate change.

Abstract: Kant's Idea and Conjectural Beginning: Blueprints for Sustainability

In the *Idea for a Universal History* and *Conjectural Beginning*, Kant presents a developmental view of humanity: humanity progresses on a pathway of perfection as it strives for an enlightened, cosmopolitan future. This paper attempts to hone in on the ethical insights of Kant's anthropological texts with an eye for their contemporary application. Specifically, it is argued that the collective and holistic aspects of Kant's philosophy of history and understanding of humanity are relevant for the ethical challenges of anthropogenic climate change. In the first part, I outline Kant's vision of humanity as collective, historical, and progressive, drawing from the *Idea* and *Conjectural Beginning*. In the second part, I utilize Kant's teleological view of humanity to show that conceiving of climate change as a heroic project for our historical progression instills in us the mettle to overcome it and transition to sustainable cosmopolitanism.

V – Saturday, 13 October (Morning)

ROOM A1

SILVIA ALTMANN is a professor at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Her PhD was about Kant's category of existence. Her main interests are in the notions of judgement, concept and consciousness in the history of philosophy, with publications about Descartes, Kant and Wittgenstein.

Abstract: Perception, Concepts and Consciousness

The question about cognitive capacities involved in human perception has been a subject of discussion both in the exegesis of Kant's texts as well as in contemporary debates in theory of perception. As has already been pointed out, care must be taken not to make an anachronic and decontextualized use of certain key technical terms. I would like to suggest that perhaps the term "consciousness" is one of those terms. Whereas it seems clear that Kant attributes representations (and therefore awareness in the sense of the exercise of any function not reducible to merely physiological ones) to non-rational animals, it is far from clear that he would attribute them what he calls consciousness, the latter being closely connected to apperception, which Kant explicitly denies of non-rational animals. This presentation tries to take some steps towards a clarification of what, for Kant, is involved in representation with consciousness in the Kantian sense, as well as its consequences for the Kantian notion of perception, which, by definition, for Kant, involves consciousness.

HERNÁN PRINCE Researcher at the CONICET (Institute of Philosophy, UBA, Argentina). Full professor (Diego Portales University, Santiago, Chile). Coordinator of the Kantian Studies Group (UBA, Argentina). Coordinator of the joint PhD program in philosophy (Diego Portales University, Santiago, Chile & Leiden University, Holland). Director of the *Revista de Estudios Kantianos*, journal of the Society of Kantian Studies in Spanish Language (SEKLE).

Abstract: Transcendental and Concrete Subjectivity in the Marburg School

The purpose of this talk is to analyse and compare the way in which Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp deal with the problem of the cognitive subject and, in particular, with the relationship between transcendental and concrete subjectivity. Even though Cohen and Natorp share a certain philosophical method for approaching this problem, their results are quite different. While for Cohen concrete subjectivity remains an open issue, without a proper philosophical account, Natorp manages to put forward a theory of concrete subjectivity within the very limits imposed by the transcendental method. However, Natorp soon encounters difficulties in this doctrine and modifies his initial position. In his late theory of subjectivity, Natorp inverts Cohen's viewpoint and even departs from the framework established by the transcendental method.

SANDRA PALERMO: Associate Researcher by CONICET (Argentina) and associate professor of "History of Modern German Philosophy" at the University of Río Cuarto (Argentina). Research areas: German Idealism and the Italian Neo-Idealism, with special focus in Kant and Hegel and in Luigi Scaravelli, respectively. Published books: Il bisogno della filosofia. L'itinerario speculativo di Hegel tra Francoforte e Jena (1797-1803), Mimesis, Milan 2011; Tra critica e metafisica. Luigi Scaravelli lettore di Kant, ETS, Pisa 2012; Sulla Prima Introduzione alla Critica della facoltà di Giudizio, ESI, Napoli 2014.

Abstract: Della peculiarità del Naturzweck.

The goal of the paper is to offer an analysis of the concept of Naturzweck, as we find it in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The interpretative path we try to unfold aims to show the theoretical shift that the concept of natural end undergoes between the Analytic and the Dialectic of the Teleological Power of Judgment: defined firstly as such that implies something that is «cause and effect of itself», the notion of natural end unfolds, afterward in the text, as mutual causal relation between the whole and the parts, hence that what distinguishes natural products from products of art, according to Kant, is the fact that the former exclude the possibility of an external producer. In this sense, Kant can say that «one says far too little about nature and its capacity in organized products if one calls this an analogue of art» (KU, 375; CJ, 246). However, despite of the theoretical effort made by Kant in §§ 64 and 65 to grasp the specific characters of natural ends and to distinguish these from artifacts, in the Dialectic of the Teleological Judgment the natural product seems to be instead thought of only in light of the technical-practical causality. And this thought is now at the basis of the purely reflecting character of teleological judgment, thus «experience certainly exhibits ends, but that these are at the same time intentions cannot be proved in any way» (EE, GS XX, 234; CJ, 35).

ROOM A2

ILARIA FERRARA is currently a PhD student in Ethical, Moral and Political curriculum at the North West Philosophy Consortium (FINO) - University of Pavia (Italy). Her doctoral research project is related to the aesthetics, moral and political philosophy, between ancient and modern thought, particularly in Immanuel Kant and in classical German philosophy.

Abstract: **Analogy and Symbol. A Question of Kantian Hermeneutics**

The aim of the paper is to investigate the concept of analogy both in a historical and genetic sense and according to a linguistic and epistemological perspective. The analogy emerges in the scholastic and rationalist philosophy of the eighteenth century and is recovered from Kant as a *scientia signorum* from precritical thought, both in the interests of natural physics and in those of logic and semantics. The writings of maturity consider the analogy as a gnoseological methodology connected to the *symbolic cognitio*, linked to the thematization of the supersensible concepts. In particular, in *the Critique of Judgment*, Kant refers to the symbolic analogy to determine the ideas of reason, taking distance from the transcendental schematism. Finally, the analogies of the experience of the critique of pure reason offer themselves to the debate concerning contemporary physics, both with a critical purpose and with conservative intentions.

CHONG-FUK LAU is Professor of Philosophy at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is the author of *Hegels Urteilskritik* (2004), *A New Interpretation of Hegel* (2014 in Chinese), a number of articles in *Kant-Lexikon* (2015) and a dozen of papers on Kant and Hegel in journals such as *The Review of Metaphysics*, *Kant-Studien*, *Kantian Review*, *Kant Yearbook*, *Idealistic Studies*, *The Owl of Minerva*, *Hegel-Jahrbuch* and *Perspektiven der Philosophie*.

Abstract: **Noumena as Abstracta**

This paper takes a fresh look at Kant's transcendental idealism with a new reading of noumena as *abstract* entities. It shows that the three criteria for abstractness, i.e., non-spatiotemporality, causal inefficacy, and non-indiscernibility, are true of Kant's noumena. Phenomena, by contrast, are concrete entities in space and time, which can be understood as *spatiotemporally instantiated* noumena. Kant's distinction between noumena in positive and negative sense will be reinterpreted as a distinction between *non-spatiotemporally instantiated* concrete entities and *uninstantiated* abstract entities. It argues that the noumenal ignorance is confined to positive noumena, which are to be identified with things in themselves.

GENNARO LUISE teaches *History of Modern Philosophy* and *Metaphysics* at the School of Philosophy of the Pontificia Università della Santa Croce (Roma). He has published essays on Kant, Hegel, Maréchal and Fabro. He is member of the editorial board of the on-line journal *Forum. Supplement to Acta Philosophica*. Among his recent publications: A. Acerbi - F. F. Labastida - G. Luise (eds.), *La filosofia come Paideia. Contributi sul ruolo educativo degli studi filosofici*, Roma 2016 and the monography *Metafisica dell'Intelletto e Necessità*, Roma 2018 (in press).

Abstract: Philosophical Reason and theological Reason in the *Streit der Fakultäten*

The conclusion of the conflict between theological and philosophical faculties, as outlined in the *Conflict of the Faculties*, leads us to consider that revelation and its moral interpretation must be kept true as divine; nevertheless, the same effect, or at least the same moral disposition, is obtained through a reason which professes its autonomously deduced moral religion. Onto the Kantian doctrine of the rational faith weigh, however, two significant aporias that we intend to discuss within the paper. The first lies in the difficulty in confining philosophical reason to a role of free service to the truth, without implying a sort of Deduction of religious experience. A second aporia would imply the impossibility of thinking God as one and undivided. Certainly, a reflection on these issues may constitute a laboratory to propose a contemporary implementation of the Kantian proposal in the field of philosophy of religion and natural theology.

ROOM A3

MARIA BORGES is full professor of Philosophy at the University of Santa Catarina (Brazil) and the President of the Brazilian Kant Society. She was Visiting Scholar at the University of Pennsylvania (USA), Humboldt Universität (Germany) and Columbia University (USA). She is researcher of the CNPq/Brazil. She published many books and papers, including “What can Kant teach us about emotions” (*The Journal of Philosophy*, 2004) and “Physiology and the Controlling of Affects in Kant’s Philosophy” (*Kantian Review*, 2008).

Abstract: Pleasure and Displeasure in Kant’s Practical Philosophy

In this paper, I analyse the theory of motivation in Kant’s practical philosophy. I examine the the feeling of respect and moral feeling, showing their relation to moral action. I show that Kant offers different answers to this question in different works. In the *Groundwork*, Kant claims that not only one can, but one *should* act without any moral feeling.

In the *Doctrine of Virtue*, however, Kant claims that there are some feelings which are subjective conditions of receptiveness of the concept of duty. These are moral feeling, conscience, love of human beings and self-respect. Moral feeling seems to be a product of the representation of moral law, consequently it is not an incentive to act morally. However, Kant also claims that moral feeling is a susceptibility on the part of free choice to be moved by pure practical reason. At the end, I present the intellectualist-affectionist debate regarding motivation in Kant.

LUKE J. DAVIES I am currently finishing up a DPhil in philosophy at Merton College Oxford. In my doctoral thesis, I develop and defend a reading of Kant’s account of citizenship. In particular, I offer a systematic reading of Kant’s claim that the attributes of citizens are freedom, equality, and independence. Prior to starting the DPhil, I completed the BPhil in philosophy, also at Oxford. My BA is from the University of Toronto.

Abstract: The Incentive of Honor in the Doctrine of Right

In the *Doctrine of Right*, Kant claims that there are two crimes that deserve death, but that “it still remains rather doubtful whether legislation is...authorised to impose the death penalty” (6:335).

These are infanticide and killing someone in a duel. According to Kant, these crimes are motivated by the feeling of honour. One significant problem arises for Kant given this claim. It indicates that Kant's account of punishment is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of assurance that plagues the state of nature. This paper addresses that problem.

TOSHIRO OSAWA completed his PhD in Philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney, in 2014. He specializes in Baumgarten's ethics with particular focus on his legacy in Kant's ethics. His latest paper, "Kant's Debt to Baumgarten in His Religious (Un-)Grounding of Ethics", is due out in *Kant Yearbook* 2018.

Abstract: Why Conscience Can Be Mistaken: Baumgarten Contra Kant

This paper examines the validity of Kant's claim that conscience cannot be mistaken by assessing Baumgarten's opposite claim against which Kant structures his argument. Behind this claim is Kant's assumption that a rational being immediately and spontaneously knows whether an action she intends to undertake is good or bad and that this knowledge is infallible. But how can this argument be defended, if we consider cases where, for example, people seem to have no conflict of conscience when recommending us to live in Tokyo located roughly 250 kilometres away from Fukushima, the site of the nuclear disaster. In this paper, I argue that a person must have the knowledge, even the faintest, of the consequence(s) of an action that she intends to undertake to have any conscience at all. Conscience can be mistaken.

ROOM A4

LUC FOISNEAU Director of research at CNRS (CESPRA), teaches political philosophy at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS) in Paris, where he is the director of the political studies department. He has published extensively on Hobbes and early modern political philosophy (notably, *Hobbes. La vie inquiète*, Paris, 2016), coedited a book on Kant and Hobbes (*Kant et Hobbes. De la violence à la politique*, Paris, 2005), and is currently working on contemporary theories of justification.

Abstract: Being Kantian About Justification

In this paper I would like to consider the question of justification in a Kantian perspective. And to consider, first, why a Kantian should bother about the notion of justification. To try and answer that question we would like to take, as a starting point, the debate between Scanlon and Korsgaard, since it conduces the latter to affirm that there is a proper Kantian way do deal with justification, to which the former reacts by stressing that he is not a Kantian. The latter affirmation may seem paradoxical since contemporary theories of justification have been marked by Rawls' heavy reference to Kant. This discussion shall allow us to enquire further about the notion of reason in its connection with our capacity to justify both our actions and beliefs.

STEFANO BACIN is Senior Assistant Professor of History of Philosophy at the University of Milan. He is the author of *Il senso dell'etica. Kant e la costruzione di una teoria morale* (2006) and *Fichte*

in Schulpforta (2007). He is co-editor of *Kant-Lexikon* (2015, with Marcus Willaschek, Georg Mohr and Jürgen Stolzenberg) and of *The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy* (2018, with Oliver Sensen).

Abstract: Kant's Ethics and the Idea of the Unity of Virtue

The idea of the unity of virtue, in different flavours, is still intensely debated among virtue ethicists. While some endorse some variant of the thesis of the unity of virtue, and consider it belonging to the core of virtue ethics altogether, others reject it as untenable. The relation between Kantian, ethics and virtue ethics has been one important trend of the debate in the last decades, both in Kant scholarship and normative ethics. Yet, the Unity of Virtue thesis has hardly been considered in that respect. With regard to current debates in virtue ethics, I shall argue, against recent suggestions, that Kant's ethics does entail a commitment to a specific variant of the thesis of the Unity of Virtue. In fact, the idea of the unity of virtue provides important insight in Kant's own conception.

ANDREW CHIGNELL works in the departments of Philosophy, Religion, and the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University.

Abstract: Kant on Despair and the Moral Psychology of Difference-Making

Consumers and activists who want to “make a difference” in the context of massive, globalized supply systems face a familiar moral-psychological challenge. The size and apparent insensitivity of such systems threaten to demoralize us in two ways: we despair in the face of the very long odds of making a significant positive difference by way of our boycotting and consumption habits and, thus, we lose the psychological resolve required to do what we still take ourselves to have moral reason to do. My goal here is to argue that the most intriguing version of Kant's moral proof (in later works like the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), *Gemeinspruch* essay (1793) and *Religionsschrift* (1793)) is focused on combatting precisely this kind of demoralization, and that a secular version of the proof may be useful in contemporary contexts too.

ROOM A5

DANIEL KOLTONSKI is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware, where he teaches ethics and social & political philosophy.

Abstract: Kant, Pretextual Justifications, and Refusing to Uphold the Law

One of Kant's more infamous positions is that a citizen has a duty to uphold the laws of her state, regardless of the character of that state's rule. His account is thus surprisingly *illiberal*: virtually all existing states are legitimate authorities whose laws its citizens must uphold. And it is all the more surprising because Kant starts from a solidly liberal foundation: the task of justice—and so the aim of law—is, on his view, the realization of equal freedom.

I argue, first, that Kant's position on political obligation doesn't in fact follow from his underlying view and, second, that the position that does follow from it is more interesting and, importantly,

somewhat more radical than many mainstream liberal views that hold that citizens of “reasonably just states” do have a general (if overridable) duty to uphold the law.

DANIEL ARONSON is a research fellow at RAS Institute of Philosophy, Moscow. His Ph.D. thesis, defended in 2015, was on the foundations of Kant's Doctrine of Right. He teaches at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences and the State Academic University for Humanities. His research interests include Kantianism, continental political philosophy and environmental philosophy.

Abstract: ‘That, in Comparison with Which Everything Else Is Small’: Kant’s Critique of Climate Change Denial

Beside an outright rejection of scientific facts, climate change denial takes various subtler forms. One might see the very tendency to represent climate change in these or those particular terms (ecological, economic, political, etc.) as denying the comprehensiveness of the phenomenon, which cannot be properly understood as long as it is reduced to its single aspects. Similarly, one could see Kant’s aspiration in the *Critique of Judgment* to bridge the gap between moral and theoretical world-view as an attempt to cope with denialism implicit in either of them. Kant’s account of the sublime is meant to show how a certain experience can overcome the one-sidedness of either moral or theoretical outlook and refer to ‘absolute totality as a real idea’. Today, it may be thought-provoking to understand climate change as such a totality.

ANGELO CICATELLO (Palermo 1972) is Associate Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Palermo, where he teaches Metaphysics. A researcher on Kant and German classical philosophy, he has also taken an interest in the themes of Classical Critical Theory and developments of ontological-metaphysical problems within contemporary reflection. He is the author of the volumes *Dialettica negativa e logica della parvenza. Saggio su Th. W. Adorno* (2001), *Soggettività e trascendenza. Da Kant a Heidegger* (2005), *Ontologica critica e metafisica. Studio su Kant* (2011).

Abstract: Revolution and Progress in Kantian Reason

Kant’s project for a critique of reason exhibits a foundation with a profile that is avowedly not despotic. That is to say, the sense in which Kant speaks of reason as a faculty of principles appears to be intimately connected with the idea that “principle”, in a strict sense, can only be said of what does not escape the critical opinion and autonomy of thought that such a judgment necessarily involves. The strictly *political* form of government that is applied, according to Kant, to the operation of reason as exercise of non-despotic power affords a privileged point of view from which to reread in terms that are not necessarily antagonistic the image, a widespread one in the contemporary debate, of a Kant torn between revolutionary spirit and reformist profile.

ROOM A6

VALENTINA DAFNE DE VITA I am a Ph.D. candidate at Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg and I studied Philosophy at the Universities of Naples and Dresden (Germany). My Ph. D. Project is about the “Duties to Oneself” in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Since 2017 I have been contributing to the project *Nietzsches Bibliothek. Digitale Edition und philosophischer Kommentar*. The areas I am interested are moral, political and theoretical philosophy, Kant and the Frankfurt school.

Abstract: Kant’s Practical Reason in Political and Philosophical Contemporary Debate

The aim of my study is to understand how Kant’s philosophy influenced political Debate in the 20th. In my research I analyze, on one hand, philosophers of Frankfurter School as Adorno and Habermas, who believed from different perspectives that the practical reason holds the best elements for politic debate and for the evolution of a democratic theory. On the other, authors like Arendt and Lyotard supposed that the Judgment in force of the common Sense would work better in the democratically debate. The purposes are twice: Firstly, to analyze the relation between moral and politic in Kant’s Works; Secondly, I want to proof these different interpretations of Kant’s political thinking, trying to understand which one could be suitable for a theory of democracy nowadays.

PÄRTTYLI RINNE is occupied as a Senior Researcher at the Academia Kantiana (Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University). He received his PhD in philosophy from the University of St Andrews in 2016; and his research interests include philosophy of love, Kant and Kantian ethics, history of Western philosophy, and evolutionary philosophy. He has recently published a monograph *Kant on Love* (De Gruyter 2018).

Abstract: Love in Global Politics: A Kantian Reworking of Rawls and Nussbaum

This paper argues that love ought to play a substantial role in the shaping of global politics, and that Kant’s practical philosophy offers resources for conceptualising politically effective love in a global context. Drawing from the moral psychological accounts of love by John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum, I argue first that there is an interplay between the policies of public institutions and the emotional dispositions of citizens in a given political context, and that love can facilitate political action. In contrast to Nussbaum’s prescription of ‘love of one’s country’, and Rawls’s notion of ‘love of mankind’ as ‘supererogatory’, I argue that to effectively confront the most pressing global problems of our time, what humanity needs politically is a more direct rational and emotional engagement with representations of the planet Earth and of our species as a whole in terms of love. I contend that Kant’s notions of ‘universal love of human beings’ and ‘friend of human beings’ can be appealing from this perspective.